/****************************************************************************
*																			*
*						 cryptlib PGP Key Read Routines						*
*						Copyright Peter Gutmann 1992-2007					*
*																			*
****************************************************************************/

#if defined( INC_ALL )
  #include "crypt.h"
  #include "misc_rw.h"
  #include "pgp_rw.h"
  #include "keyset.h"
  #include "pgp_key.h"
#else
  #include "crypt.h"
  #include "enc_dec/misc_rw.h"
  #include "enc_dec/pgp_rw.h"
  #include "keyset/keyset.h"
  #include "keyset/pgp_key.h"
#endif /* Compiler-specific includes */

#ifdef USE_PGPKEYS

/****************************************************************************
*																			*
*								Utility Routines							*
*																			*
****************************************************************************/

/* Get the size of an encoded MPI and skip the payload data */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1, 4 ) ) \
static int getMPIsize( INOUT STREAM *stream, 
					   IN_LENGTH_PKC const int minMpiSize, 
					   IN_LENGTH_PKC const int maxMpiSize,
					   OUT_LENGTH_SHORT_Z int *length )
	{
	const long position = stell( stream );
	int dummy, status;

	assert( isWritePtr( stream, sizeof( STREAM ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( length, sizeof( int ) ) );

	REQUIRES( minMpiSize > 0 && minMpiSize <= CRYPT_MAX_PKCSIZE );
	REQUIRES( maxMpiSize > 0 && maxMpiSize >= minMpiSize && \
			  maxMpiSize <= CRYPT_MAX_PKCSIZE );

	/* Clear return value */
	*length = 0;
	
	status = readInteger16Ubits( stream, NULL, &dummy, minMpiSize, 
								 maxMpiSize );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( status );
	*length = ( int ) stell( stream ) - position;

	return( CRYPT_OK );
	}

/* Determine the minimum allowed packet size for a given packet type.  The 
   minimum-length packet that we can encounter is a single-byte trust 
   packet, then two bytes for a userID, and three bytes for a marker 
   packet.  Other than that all packets must be at least eight bytes in 
   length */

CHECK_RETVAL_RANGE( 0, 8 ) \
static int getMinPacketSize( IN_BYTE const int packetType )
	{
	ENSURES_EXT( ( packetType >= 0 && \
				   packetType <= 0xFF ), 0 );
				 /* This could be any packet type including new values not
				    covered by the PGP_PACKET_TYPE range so we can't be too
					picky about values */

	return( ( packetType == PGP_PACKET_TRUST ) ? 1 : \
			( packetType == PGP_PACKET_USERID ) ? 2 : \
			( packetType == PGP_PACKET_MARKER ) ? 3 : 8 );
	}

/* Scan a sequence of key packets to find the extent of the packet group.  In
   addition to simply scanning this function handles over-long packets by
   reporting their overall length and returning OK_SPECIAL, and will try to 
   resync to a packet group if it starts in the middle of an arbitrary packet 
   collection, for example due to skipping of an over-long packet found 
   earlier */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1, 2 ) ) \
static int scanPacketGroup( INOUT STREAM *stream,
							OUT_LENGTH_SHORT_Z int *packetGroupLength,
							const BOOLEAN isLastGroup )
	{
	BOOLEAN firstPacket = TRUE, skipPackets = FALSE;
	int endPos = 0, iterationCount, status = CRYPT_OK;

	assert( isReadPtr( stream, sizeof( STREAM ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( packetGroupLength, sizeof( int ) ) );

	/* Clear return value */
	*packetGroupLength = 0;

	for( iterationCount = 0; iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_LARGE;
		 iterationCount++ )
		{
		long length;
		int ctb, type;

		/* Get the next CTB.  If it's the start of another packet group,
		   we're done */
		ctb = status = sPeek( stream );
		if( cryptStatusOK( status ) && !( pgpIsCTB( ctb ) ) )
			status = CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA;
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			/* If we ran out of input data let the caller know, however if 
			   this is the last packet group then running out of data isn't
			   an error */
			if( status == CRYPT_ERROR_UNDERFLOW )
				{
				if( !isLastGroup )
					skipPackets = TRUE;
				break;
				}
			return( status );
			}
		type = pgpGetPacketType( ctb );
		if( firstPacket )
			{
			/* If the packet group doesn't start with the expected packet
			   type, skip packets to try and resync */
			if( type != PGP_PACKET_PUBKEY && type != PGP_PACKET_SECKEY )
				skipPackets = TRUE;
			firstPacket = FALSE;
			}
		else
			{
			/* If we've found the start of a new packet group, we're done */
			if( type == PGP_PACKET_PUBKEY || type == PGP_PACKET_SECKEY )
				break;
			}

		/* Skip the current packet in the buffer */
		status = pgpReadPacketHeader( stream, NULL, &length, \
									  getMinPacketSize( type ) );
		if( cryptStatusOK( status ) )
			{
			endPos = stell( stream ) + length;
			status = sSkip( stream, length );
			}
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			/* If we ran out of input data let the caller know */
			if( status == CRYPT_ERROR_UNDERFLOW )
				{
				skipPackets = TRUE;
				break;
				}
			return( status );
			}
		}
	ENSURES( iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_LARGE );

	/* Remember where the current packet group ends.  If we skipped packets 
	   or consumed all of the input in the buffer and there's more present 
	   beyond that, tell the caller to discard the data and try again */
	*packetGroupLength = endPos;
	return( skipPackets ? OK_SPECIAL : CRYPT_OK );
	}

/****************************************************************************
*																			*
*							Process Key Packet Components					*
*																			*
****************************************************************************/

/* Read the information needed to decrypt a private key */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1, 2 ) ) \
static int readPrivateKeyDecryptionInfo( INOUT STREAM *stream, 
										 INOUT PGP_KEYINFO *keyInfo )
	{
	const int ctb = sgetc( stream );
	int ivSize = 8, value, status;

	assert( isWritePtr( stream, sizeof( STREAM ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( keyInfo, sizeof( PGP_KEYINFO ) ) );

	/* Clear return values */
	keyInfo->cryptAlgo = keyInfo->hashAlgo = CRYPT_ALGO_NONE;
	keyInfo->saltSize = keyInfo->keySetupIterations = 0;

	/* Before we go any further make sure that we were at least able to read 
	   the CTB */
	if( cryptStatusError( ctb ) )
		return( ctb );

	/* If no encryption is being used we mark the key as unusable.  This 
	   isn't exactly the correct thing to do, but storing plaintext private 
	   keys on disk is extremely dangerous and we probably shouldn't be
	   using them, and in any case an attempt to import an unencrypted key 
	   will trigger so many security check failures in the key unwrap code 
	   that it's not even worth trying */
	if( ctb == 0 )
		return( CRYPT_ERROR_NOSECURE );

	/* If it's a direct algorithm specifier then it's a PGP 2.x packet with 
	   raw IDEA encryption */
	if( ctb == PGP_ALGO_IDEA )
		{
		keyInfo->cryptAlgo = CRYPT_ALGO_IDEA;
		keyInfo->hashAlgo = CRYPT_ALGO_MD5;
		status = sread( stream, keyInfo->iv, ivSize );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			return( status );
		keyInfo->ivSize = ivSize;

		return( CRYPT_OK );
		}

	/* Must be an S2K specifier */
	if( ctb != PGP_S2K && ctb != PGP_S2K_HASHED )
		return( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA );

	/* Get the key wrap algorithm and S2K information.  We have to save a 
	   copy of the raw PGP algorithm ID for later examination to determine
	   the AES key size to use */
	value = sPeek( stream );
	status = readPgpAlgo( stream, &keyInfo->cryptAlgo, 
						  PGP_ALGOCLASS_PWCRYPT );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		{
		if( status == CRYPT_ERROR_NOTAVAIL )
			{
			/* Unknown algorithm type, skip this packet */
			return( OK_SPECIAL );
			}

		 return( status );
		 }
	if( keyInfo->cryptAlgo == CRYPT_ALGO_AES )
		{
		/* PGP uses three different algorithm IDs to identify AES with 
		   different key sizes (ugh) so we have to remember the key size 
		   alongside the algorithm type for this algorithm */
		keyInfo->aesKeySize = ( value == PGP_ALGO_AES_128 ) ? 16 : \
							  ( value == PGP_ALGO_AES_192 ) ? 24 : 32;
		ivSize = 16;
		}
	status = value = sgetc( stream );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( status );
	if( value != 0 && value != 1 && value != 3 )
		return( OK_SPECIAL );
	status = readPgpAlgo( stream, &keyInfo->hashAlgo, 
						  PGP_ALGOCLASS_HASH );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		{
		if( status == CRYPT_ERROR_NOTAVAIL )
			{
			/* Unknown algorithm type, skip this packet */
			return( OK_SPECIAL );
			}

		 return( status );
		 }
	if( value != 0 )
		{
		/* It's a salted hash */
		status = sread( stream, keyInfo->salt, PGP_SALTSIZE );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			return( status );
		keyInfo->saltSize = PGP_SALTSIZE;
		}
	if( value == 3 )
		{
		long iterations;

		/* It's a salted iterated hash, get the iteration count, limited to 
		   a sane value.  The "iteration count" is actually a count of how 
		   many bytes are hashed, this is because the "iterated hashing" 
		   treats the salt + password as an infinitely-repeated sequence of 
		   values and hashes the resulting string for PGP-iteration-count 
		   bytes worth.  The value that we calculate here (to prevent 
		   overflow on 16-bit machines) is the count without the base * 64 
		   scaling, this also puts the range within the value of the 
		   standard sanity check.  Note that there's a mutant GPG build used 
		   with loop-AES that uses 8M setup iterations, why this is used and 
		   why it writes PGP keys with this setting is uncertain but 
		   cryptlib will reject keys with this value as being outside the 
		   range of sane values (for an 8-byte salt and a typical 8-byte 
		   password this would lead to 8M / 16 = 512K iterations of the PRF,
		   a value so extreme that it'd normally only be used in a DoS 
		   attack).
		   
		   Unfortunately however PGP Desktop 9 (apparently) in its default
		   config will use values up to 4M (= 256K iterations of the PRF),
		   which the sanity-check code would also reject.  It's uncertain at 
		   which point we should draw the line here, on the one hand we want 
		   to be able to handle PGP Desktop's data but we also want some 
		   protection against DoS attacks due to ridiculously high iteration 
		   counts.  For now we reject obviously invalid values (ones less 
		   than zero or which would cause an overflow once the base * 64 
		   scaling is applied) and in addition tell the caller to skip the
		   packet (without rejecting the overall keyring data) if the
		   iteration count would be larger than 128K for the typical 8-byte
		   password case above */
		value = sgetc( stream );
		if( cryptStatusError( value ) )
			return( value );
		iterations = ( 16 + ( ( long ) value & 0x0F ) ) << ( value >> 4 );
		if( iterations <= 0 || iterations >= MAX_INTLENGTH / 64 )
			return( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA );
		if( iterations >= 32768L )	/* 32K * 4 = 128K iterations */
			return( OK_SPECIAL );
		keyInfo->keySetupIterations = ( int ) iterations;
		}
	if( ctb == PGP_S2K_HASHED )
		{
		/* The legacy PGP 2.x key integrity protection format used a simple 
		   16-bit additive checksum of the encrypted MPI payload, the newer 
		   OpenPGP format uses a SHA-1 MDC.  There's also a halfway format 
		   used in older OpenPGP versions that still uses the 16-bit 
		   checksum but encrypts the entire MPI data block rather than just 
		   the payload */
		keyInfo->hashedChecksum = TRUE;
		}
	status = sread( stream, keyInfo->iv, ivSize );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( status );
	keyInfo->ivSize = ivSize;

	return( CRYPT_OK );
	}

/* Read public-key components */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1, 2, 3 ) ) \
static int readPublicKeyComponents( INOUT STREAM *stream, 
									INOUT PGP_KEYINFO *keyInfo,
									OUT_INT_Z int *pubKeyComponentLength )
	{
	int pgpPkcAlgo, length, totalLength = 1, status;
					/* Initial length 1 is for the algorithm ID byte */

	assert( isWritePtr( stream, sizeof( STREAM ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( keyInfo, sizeof( PGP_KEYINFO ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( pubKeyComponentLength, sizeof( int ) ) );

	/* Clear return value */
	*pubKeyComponentLength = 0;

	/* Get the public-key algorithm type */
	status = pgpPkcAlgo = sgetc( stream );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( status );

	/* RSA: n + e.  The LSBs of n serve as the PGP 2.x key ID so we copy the 
	   data out before continuing */
	if( pgpPkcAlgo == PGP_ALGO_RSA || pgpPkcAlgo == PGP_ALGO_RSA_ENCRYPT || \
		pgpPkcAlgo == PGP_ALGO_RSA_SIGN )
		{
		keyInfo->pkcAlgo = CRYPT_ALGO_RSA;
		if( pgpPkcAlgo != PGP_ALGO_RSA_SIGN )
			keyInfo->usageFlags = KEYMGMT_FLAG_USAGE_CRYPT;
		if( pgpPkcAlgo != PGP_ALGO_RSA_ENCRYPT )
			keyInfo->usageFlags |= KEYMGMT_FLAG_USAGE_SIGN;
		status = getMPIsize( stream, MIN_PKCSIZE, CRYPT_MAX_PKCSIZE, 
							 &length );			/* n */
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			return( status );
		totalLength += length;
		assert( PGP_KEYID_SIZE < MIN_PKCSIZE );
	
		/* Move back and copy out the last PGP_KEYID_SIZE bytes of n as the PGP 
		   2.x key ID */
		status = sseek( stream, stell( stream ) - PGP_KEYID_SIZE );
		if( cryptStatusOK( status ) )
			status = sread( stream, keyInfo->pgpKeyID, PGP_KEYID_SIZE );
		if( cryptStatusOK( status ) )
			status = getMPIsize( stream, 1, CRYPT_MAX_PKCSIZE, &length );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )		/* e */
			return( status );
		*pubKeyComponentLength = totalLength + length;

		return( CRYPT_OK );
		}

	/* If it's an unknown algorithm, skip this key */
	if( pgpPkcAlgo != PGP_ALGO_DSA && pgpPkcAlgo != PGP_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
		return( OK_SPECIAL );

	/* DSA/Elgamal: p + g + y.  Note that we have to separate out the 
	   getMPIsize() calls in order to serialise them otherwise some 
	   optimising compilers will reorder the operations, causing the check 
	   to fail because the parameters are different for the different MPI 
	   values */
	if( pgpPkcAlgo == PGP_ALGO_DSA )
		{
		keyInfo->pkcAlgo = CRYPT_ALGO_DSA;
		keyInfo->usageFlags = KEYMGMT_FLAG_USAGE_SIGN;
		}
	else
		{
		keyInfo->pkcAlgo = CRYPT_ALGO_ELGAMAL;
		keyInfo->usageFlags = KEYMGMT_FLAG_USAGE_CRYPT;
		}
	status = getMPIsize( stream, MIN_PKCSIZE, CRYPT_MAX_PKCSIZE, &length );	
	if( cryptStatusOK( status ) )				/* p */
		{
		totalLength += length;
		status = getMPIsize( stream, 1, CRYPT_MAX_PKCSIZE, &length );
		}										/* g */
	if( cryptStatusOK( status ) )
		{
		totalLength += length;
		status = getMPIsize( stream, MIN_PKCSIZE, CRYPT_MAX_PKCSIZE, 
							 &length );			/* y */
		}
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( status );
	totalLength += length;
	if( pgpPkcAlgo == PGP_ALGO_DSA )
		{
		/* DSA has q as well */
		status = getMPIsize( stream, bitsToBytes( 155 ), CRYPT_MAX_PKCSIZE, 
							 &length );			/* q */
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			return( status );
		totalLength += length;
		}
	*pubKeyComponentLength = totalLength;

	return( CRYPT_OK );
	}

/* Read a sequence of userID packets */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1 ) ) \
static int readUserID( INOUT STREAM *stream, 
					   INOUT_OPT PGP_INFO *pgpInfo,
					   INOUT_OPT HASHINFO *hashInfo )
	{
	HASHINFO localHashInfo;
	long packetLength;
	int ctb, packetType = DUMMY_INIT, iterationCount, status;

	assert( isWritePtr( stream, sizeof( STREAM ) ) );
	assert( pgpInfo == NULL || \
			isWritePtr( pgpInfo, sizeof( PGP_INFO ) ) );
	assert( hashInfo == NULL || \
			isWritePtr( hashInfo, sizeof( HASHINFO ) ) );

	/* Take a local copy of the hash information from the primary key
	   packet */
	if( hashInfo != NULL )
		memcpy( &localHashInfo, hashInfo, sizeof( HASHINFO ) );

	/* Skip keyring trust packets, signature packets, and any private 
	   packets (GPG uses packet type 61, which might be a DSA self-
	   signature).

	   PGP has two ways of indicating key usage, either directly via the key 
	   type (e.g. PGP_ALGO_RSA_ENCRYPT vs. PGP_ALGO_RSA_SIGN) or in a rather 
	   schizophrenic manner in signature packets by allowing the signer to 
	   specify an X.509-style key usage.  Since it can appear in both self-
	   sigs and certification signatures, the exact usage for a key is 
	   somewhat complex to determine as a certification signer could 
	   indicate that they trust the key when it's used for signing while a 
	   self-signer could indicate that the key should be used for 
	   encryption.  This appears to be a preference indication rather than a 
	   hard limit like the X.509 keyUsage and also contains other odds and 
	   ends as well such as key splitting indicators.  For now we don't make 
	   use of these flags as it's a bit difficult to figure out what's what, 
	   and in any case DSA vs. Elgamal doesn't need any further constraints 
	   since there's only one usage possible */
	for( status = CRYPT_OK, iterationCount = 0; 
		 cryptStatusOK( status ) && iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MED;
		 iterationCount++ )
		{
		/* See what we've got.  If we've run out of input or it's a non-key-
		   related packet, we're done */
		status = ctb = sPeek( stream );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			break;
		packetType = pgpGetPacketType( ctb );
		if( packetType != PGP_PACKET_TRUST && \
			packetType != PGP_PACKET_SIGNATURE && \
			packetType != PGP_PACKET_USERATTR && \
			!pgpIsReservedPacket( packetType ) )
			break;

		/* Skip the packet.  If we get an error at this point we don't 
		   immediately bail out but try and return at least a partial 
		   response */
		status = pgpReadPacketHeader( stream, &ctb, &packetLength, \
									  getMinPacketSize( packetType ) );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			break;
		status = sSkip( stream, packetLength );
		}
	ENSURES( iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MED );

	/* If we've reached the end of the current collection of key packets, 
	   let the caller know that we're done.  Note that running out of input
	   is a valid condition so we don't return a fatal error code at this
	   point */
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) || packetType != PGP_PACKET_USERID )
		return( OK_SPECIAL );

	/* Record the userID (unless we're skipping the packet).  If there are 
	   more userIDs than we can record we silently ignore them.  This 
	   handles keys with weird numbers of userIDs without rejecting them 
	   just because they have, well, a weird number of userIDs */
	status = pgpReadPacketHeader( stream, &ctb, &packetLength, \
								  getMinPacketSize( packetType ) );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( status );
	if( pgpInfo != NULL && pgpInfo->lastUserID < MAX_PGP_USERIDS )
		{
		void *dataPtr;

		status = sMemGetDataBlock( stream, &dataPtr, packetLength );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			return( status );
		pgpInfo->userID[ pgpInfo->lastUserID ] = dataPtr;
		pgpInfo->userIDlen[ pgpInfo->lastUserID++ ] = ( int ) packetLength;
		}
	return( sSkip( stream, packetLength ) );
	}

/****************************************************************************
*																			*
*									Read a Key								*
*																			*
****************************************************************************/

/* Read a single key in a group of key packets.  A packet group consists of 
   a jumble of packets concatenated together following a primary key with 
   the jumble continuing until we encounter another primary key, which is 
   why we need the auxiliary scanPacketGroup() function to look ahead in the
   data stream to determine when to stop.  A typical set of packets might be:

	DSA key
	UserID
	Binding signature of DSA key and UserID
	Trust rating
	Elgamal subkey
	Binding signature of DSA key and Elgamal subkey
	Trust rating

   but almost anything else is possible, there can be arbitrary further 
   userIDs, keys, and other data floating around, all glued together in 
   various locations with binding signatures (or possibly not, since the
   signatures are optional).

   All of this is read into memory in a PGP_INFO structure with the 
   encoded data retained as follows:

	pgpInfo[ index ]->keyData			= entire packet group
					->key->pubKeyData	= DSA/RSA pubkey payload
					->key->privKeyData	= DSA/RSA privkey payload (without
										  decryption information, which is
										  stored separately)
					->subKey->pubKeyData= Elgamal pubkey payload
					->subKey->privKeyData=Elgamal privkey as before.

   This tries to simplify things somewhat because in practice there can be a 
   more or less arbitrary number of subkeys present, not just the obvious 
   encryption subkeys signed with the primary signing key but also further
   signing keys as subkeys, with a binding signature between the primary and
   subkey made using the subkey instead of the primary key (although it can
   also contain another binding signature from the primary key as well).

   The more or less arbitrarily complex nature of all of these bits and 
   pieces is why PGP 5, which used a keying format that was still vastly
   simpler than the current one, was split into two separate applications
   of which the more complex one did nothing but key handling and the other,
   simpler one did everything else in PGP.  It's also why we don't support
   public keyring writes, it would require a complete keyring management
   application just to deal with all of this complexity.

   Even just to read all of this stuff we have to simplify the processing a
   bit by recording the first primary key and subkey and skipping anything 
   else that may be present, the addition of arbitrary numbers of further
   subkeys each potentially with their own per-subkey userIDs is too complex
   to handle without again building a complete key management application, 
   and in any case such oddball keys are fairly rare and the basic greedy
   algorithm for handling them seems to work fine */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1, 2, 4 ) ) \
static int readKey( INOUT STREAM *stream, 
					INOUT PGP_INFO *pgpInfo, 
					IN_INT_SHORT_Z const int keyGroupNo,
					INOUT ERROR_INFO *errorInfo )
	{
	PGP_KEYINFO *keyInfo = &pgpInfo->key;
	HASHFUNCTION hashFunction;
	HASHINFO hashInfo;
	BYTE hash[ CRYPT_MAX_HASHSIZE + 8 ], packetHeader[ 64 + 8 ];
	BOOLEAN isPublicKey = TRUE, isPrimaryKey = FALSE;
	void *pubKeyPayload;
	long packetLength;
	int pubKeyPos, pubKeyPayloadPos, endPos, pubKeyPayloadLen;
	int ctb, length, value, hashSize, iterationCount, status;

	assert( isWritePtr( stream, sizeof( STREAM ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( pgpInfo, sizeof( PGP_INFO ) ) );

	REQUIRES( keyGroupNo >= 0 && keyGroupNo < MAX_INTLENGTH_SHORT );
	REQUIRES( errorInfo != NULL );

	/* Process the CTB and packet length */
	ctb = sPeek( stream );
	if( cryptStatusError( ctb ) )
		{
		/* If there was an error reading the CTB, which is the first byte of 
		   the packet group, it means that we've run out of data so we 
		   return the status as a not-found error rather than the actual
		   stream status */
		return( CRYPT_ERROR_NOTFOUND );
		}
	switch( pgpGetPacketType( ctb ) )
		{
		case PGP_PACKET_SECKEY_SUB:
			keyInfo = &pgpInfo->subKey;
			isPublicKey = FALSE;
			break;

		case PGP_PACKET_SECKEY:
			isPublicKey = FALSE;
			break;

		case PGP_PACKET_PUBKEY_SUB:
			keyInfo = &pgpInfo->subKey;
			break;

		case PGP_PACKET_PUBKEY:
			isPrimaryKey = TRUE;
			break;

		default:
			retExt( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA, 
					( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA, errorInfo, 
					  "Invalid PGP CTB %02X for key packet group %d", 
					  ctb, keyGroupNo ) );
		}
	status = pgpReadPacketHeader( stream, NULL, &packetLength, 64 );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		{
		retExt( status,
				( status, errorInfo, 
				  "Invalid PGP key packet header for key packet group %d", 
				  keyGroupNo ) );
		}
	if( packetLength < 64 || packetLength > sMemDataLeft( stream ) )
		{
		retExt( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA, 
				( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA, errorInfo, 
				  "Invalid PGP key packet length %ld for key packet group %d", 
				  packetLength, keyGroupNo ) );
		}

	/* Since there can (in theory) be arbitrary numbers of subkeys and other 
	   odds and ends attached to a key and the details of what to do with 
	   these things gets a bit vague, we just skip any further subkeys that 
	   may be present */
	if( keyInfo->pkcAlgo != CRYPT_ALGO_NONE )
		{
		status = sSkip( stream, packetLength );
		for( iterationCount = 0; 
			 cryptStatusOK( status ) && \
				iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MED; 
			 iterationCount++ )
			{
			status = readUserID( stream, pgpInfo, 
								 isPrimaryKey ? &hashInfo : NULL );
			}
		ENSURES( iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MED );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) && status != OK_SPECIAL )
			{
			retExt( status, 
					( status, errorInfo, 
					  "Invalid additional PGP subkey information for key "
					  "packet group %d", keyGroupNo ) );
			}
		}

	/* Determine which bits make up the public and the private key data.  The
	   public-key data starts at the version number and includes the date,
	   validity, and public-key components.  Since there's no length 
	   information included for this data block we have to record bookmarks
	   and then later retroactively calculate the length based on how much
	   data we've read in the meantime:

		  pubKey pubKeyPayload		 privKey			 endPos
			|		|					|					|
			v		v					v					v
		+---+---------------------------+-------------------+
		|hdr|		|	Public key		|	Private key		|
		+---+---------------------------+-------------------+
			|		|<pubKeyPayloadLen->|					|
			|<----- pubKeyDataLen ----->|<-- privKeyDLen -->| 
			|<--------------- packetLength ---------------->| */
	pubKeyPos = stell( stream );
	endPos = pubKeyPos + packetLength;
	ENSURES( endPos > pubKeyPos && endPos < MAX_INTLENGTH );
	status = value = sgetc( stream );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( status );
	if( value != PGP_VERSION_2 && value != PGP_VERSION_3 && \
		value != PGP_VERSION_OPENPGP )
		{
		/* Unknown version number, skip this packet */
		return( OK_SPECIAL );
		}
	pgpInfo->isOpenPGP = ( value == PGP_VERSION_OPENPGP ) ? TRUE : FALSE;

	/* Build the packet header, which is hashed along with the key components
	   to get the OpenPGP keyID.  This is generated anyway when the context
	   is created but we need to generate it here as well in order to locate
	   the key in the first place:

		byte		ctb = 0x99
		byte[2]		length
		byte		version = 4
		byte[4]		key generation time
	  [	byte[2]		validity time - PGP 2.x only ]
		byte[]		key data

	   We can't add the length or key data yet since we have to parse the
	   key data to know how long it is, so we can only build the static part
	   of the header at this point */
	packetHeader[ 0 ] = 0x99;
	packetHeader[ 3 ] = PGP_VERSION_OPENPGP;

	/* Read the timestamp and validity period (for PGP 2.x keys) */
	status = sread( stream, packetHeader + 4, 4 );
	if( !cryptStatusError( status ) && !pgpInfo->isOpenPGP )
		status = sSkip( stream, 2 );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( status );

	/* Read the public key components */
	pubKeyPayloadPos = stell( stream );
	status = readPublicKeyComponents( stream, keyInfo, &length );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		{
		/* If the error status is OK_SPECIAL then the problem was an
		   unrecognised algorithm or something similar so we just skip the 
		   packet */
		if( status == OK_SPECIAL )
			{
			DEBUG_DIAG(( "Encountered unrecognised algorithm while "
						 "reading key" ));
			assert( DEBUG_WARN );
			return( OK_SPECIAL );
			}
		retExt( status, 
				( status, errorInfo, 
				  "Invalid PGP public-key components for key packet group %d",
				  keyGroupNo ) );
		}

	/* Now that we know where the public key data starts and finishes, we 
	   can set up references to it */
	keyInfo->pubKeyDataLen = stell( stream ) - pubKeyPos;
	status = sMemGetDataBlockAbs( stream, pubKeyPos, &keyInfo->pubKeyData, 
								  keyInfo->pubKeyDataLen );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		{
		DEBUG_DIAG(( "Couldn't set up reference to key data" ));
		assert( DEBUG_WARN );
		return( status );
		}
	pubKeyPayloadLen = stell( stream ) - pubKeyPayloadPos;
	status = sMemGetDataBlockAbs( stream, pubKeyPayloadPos, &pubKeyPayload, 
								  pubKeyPayloadLen );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		{
		DEBUG_DIAG(( "Couldn't set up reference to key data" ));
		assert( DEBUG_WARN );
		return( status );
		}

	/* Complete the packet header that we read earlier on by adding the
	   length information */
	packetHeader[ 1 ] = intToByte( ( ( 1 + 4 + length ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
	packetHeader[ 2 ] = intToByte( ( 1 + 4 + length ) & 0xFF );

	/* Hash the data needed to generate the OpenPGP keyID */
	getHashParameters( CRYPT_ALGO_SHA1, 0, &hashFunction, &hashSize );
	hashFunction( hashInfo, NULL, 0, packetHeader, 1 + 2 + 1 + 4, 
				  HASH_STATE_START );
	hashFunction( hashInfo, hash, CRYPT_MAX_HASHSIZE, 
				  pubKeyPayload, pubKeyPayloadLen, HASH_STATE_END );
	memcpy( keyInfo->openPGPkeyID, hash + hashSize - PGP_KEYID_SIZE,
			PGP_KEYID_SIZE );

	/* If it's a private keyring, process the private key components */
	if( !isPublicKey )
		{
		/* Handle decryption information for private-key components if 
		   necessary */
		status = readPrivateKeyDecryptionInfo( stream, keyInfo );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			/* If the error status is OK_SPECIAL then the problem was an
			   unrecognised algorithm or something similar so we just skip
			   the packet */
			if( status == OK_SPECIAL )
				{
				DEBUG_DIAG(( "Encountered unrecognised algorithm while "
							 "reading key" ));
				assert( DEBUG_WARN );
				return( OK_SPECIAL );
				}
			retExt( status, 
					( status, errorInfo, 
					  "Invalid PGP private-key decryption information for "
					  "key packet group %d", keyGroupNo ) );
			}

		/* What's left is the private-key data */
		keyInfo->privKeyDataLen = endPos - stell( stream );
		status = sMemGetDataBlock( stream, &keyInfo->privKeyData, 
								   keyInfo->privKeyDataLen );
		if( cryptStatusOK( status ) )
			status = sSkip( stream, keyInfo->privKeyDataLen );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			return( status );
		}

	/* If it's the primary key, start hashing it in preparation for 
	   performing signature checks on subpackets */
	if( isPrimaryKey )
		{
		packetHeader[ 0 ] = 0x99;
		packetHeader[ 1 ] = intToByte( ( keyInfo->pubKeyDataLen >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
		packetHeader[ 2 ] = intToByte( keyInfo->pubKeyDataLen & 0xFF );	
		hashFunction( hashInfo, NULL, 0, packetHeader, 1 + 2, 
					  HASH_STATE_START );
		hashFunction( hashInfo, NULL, 0, keyInfo->pubKeyData, 
					  keyInfo->pubKeyDataLen, HASH_STATE_CONTINUE );
		}

	/* Read any associated subpacket(s), of which the only ones of real 
	   interest are the userID packet(s) */
	for( iterationCount = 0; 
		 cryptStatusOK( status ) && \
			iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MED; 
		 iterationCount++ )
		{
		status = readUserID( stream, pgpInfo, 
							 isPrimaryKey ? &hashInfo : NULL );
		}
	ENSURES( iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MED );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) && status != OK_SPECIAL )
		{
		retExt( status, 
				( status, errorInfo, 
				  "Invalid PGP userID information for key packet group %d",
				  keyGroupNo ) );
		}

	/* If there's no user ID present, set a generic label */
	if( pgpInfo->lastUserID <= 0 )
		{
		pgpInfo->userID[ 0 ] = "PGP key (no user ID found)";
		pgpInfo->userIDlen[ 0 ] = 26;
		pgpInfo->lastUserID = 1;
		}

	return( CRYPT_OK );
	}

/* Process the information in the packet group */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1, 2, 6 ) ) \
static int processPacketGroup( INOUT STREAM *stream, 
							   INOUT PGP_INFO *pgpInfo,
							   IN_OPT const KEY_MATCH_INFO *keyMatchInfo,
							   INOUT_OPT PGP_KEYINFO **matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr,
							   IN_INT_SHORT_Z const int keyGroupNo,
							   INOUT ERROR_INFO *errorInfo )
	{
	int iterationCount, status;

	assert( isWritePtr( stream, sizeof( STREAM ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( pgpInfo, sizeof( PGP_INFO ) ) );
	assert( ( keyMatchInfo == NULL && matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr == NULL ) || \
			( isReadPtr( keyMatchInfo, sizeof( KEY_MATCH_INFO ) ) && \
			  isWritePtr( matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr, sizeof( PGP_KEYINFO * ) ) ) );

	REQUIRES( ( keyMatchInfo == NULL && matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr == NULL ) || \
			  ( keyMatchInfo != NULL && matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr != NULL && \
				pgpInfo->keyData != NULL && \
				pgpInfo->keyDataLen == KEYRING_BUFSIZE ) );
	REQUIRES( keyGroupNo >= 0 && keyGroupNo < MAX_INTLENGTH_SHORT );
	REQUIRES( errorInfo != NULL );

	/* Clear the index information before we read the current key(s), since 
	   it may already have been initialised during a previous (incomplete) 
	   key read */
	memset( &pgpInfo->key, 0, sizeof( PGP_KEYINFO ) );
	memset( &pgpInfo->subKey, 0, sizeof( PGP_KEYINFO ) );
	memset( pgpInfo->userID, 0, sizeof( char * ) * MAX_PGP_USERIDS );
	memset( pgpInfo->userIDlen, 0, sizeof( int ) * MAX_PGP_USERIDS );
	pgpInfo->lastUserID = 0;

	/* Read all the packets in this packet group */
	for( status = CRYPT_OK, iterationCount = 0;
		 cryptStatusOK( status ) && sMemDataLeft( stream ) > 0 && \
			iterationCount++ < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MED;
		 iterationCount++ )
		{
		status = readKey( stream, pgpInfo, keyGroupNo, errorInfo );
		}
	ENSURES( iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MED );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		{
		if( status != OK_SPECIAL && status != CRYPT_ERROR_NOSECURE )
			return( status );

		/* There's either something in the key information that we can't 
		   handle or it's stored with no security, skip the key */
		if( keyMatchInfo == NULL )
			pgpFreeEntry( pgpInfo );
		return( status );
		}

	/* If we're reading all keys, we're done */
	if( keyMatchInfo == NULL )
		return( CRYPT_OK );

	/* We're searching for a particular key, see if this is the one */
	if( pgpCheckKeyMatch( pgpInfo, &pgpInfo->key, keyMatchInfo ) )
		{
		*matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr = &pgpInfo->key;
		return( CRYPT_OK );
		}
	if( pgpCheckKeyMatch( pgpInfo, &pgpInfo->subKey, keyMatchInfo ) )
		{
		*matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr = &pgpInfo->subKey;
		return( CRYPT_OK );
		}

	/* No match, tell the caller to keep looking */
	return( CRYPT_ERROR_NOTFOUND );
	}

/****************************************************************************
*																			*
*								Read a Keyring								*
*																			*
****************************************************************************/

/* Read an entire keyring.  This function can be used in one of two ways, if 
   key match information is supplied each packet will be checked against it 
   and the read will exit when a match is found (used for public keyrings).  
   If no key match information is supplied, all keys will be read into 
   memory (used for private keyrings) */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1, 2, 4, 8, 9 ) ) \
static int processKeyringPackets( INOUT STREAM *stream, 
								  IN_ARRAY( maxNoPgpObjects ) PGP_INFO *pgpInfo, 
								  IN_LENGTH_SHORT const int maxNoPgpObjects,
								  OUT_BUFFER_FIXED( bufSize ) BYTE *buffer, 
								  IN_LENGTH_SHORT_MIN( 64 ) const int bufSize,
								  IN_OPT const KEY_MATCH_INFO *keyMatchInfo,
								  INOUT_OPT PGP_KEYINFO **matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr,
								  OUT BOOLEAN *unhandledDataPresent,
								  INOUT ERROR_INFO *errorInfo )
	{
	BYTE streamBuffer[ STREAM_BUFSIZE + 8 ];
	BOOLEAN moreData, insecureKeys = FALSE;
	int bufEnd, keyGroupNo = 0, iterationCount, status;

	assert( isWritePtr( stream, sizeof( STREAM ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( pgpInfo, sizeof( PGP_INFO ) * maxNoPgpObjects ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( buffer, bufSize ) );
	assert( ( keyMatchInfo == NULL && matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr == NULL ) || \
			( isReadPtr( keyMatchInfo, sizeof( KEY_MATCH_INFO ) ) && \
			  isWritePtr( matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr, sizeof( PGP_KEYINFO * ) ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( unhandledDataPresent, sizeof( BOOLEAN ) ) );

	REQUIRES( maxNoPgpObjects >= 1 && maxNoPgpObjects < MAX_INTLENGTH_SHORT );
	REQUIRES( bufSize > 64 && bufSize < MAX_INTLENGTH_SHORT );
	REQUIRES( ( keyMatchInfo == NULL && matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr == NULL ) || \
			  ( keyMatchInfo != NULL && matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr != NULL && \
				pgpInfo->keyData != NULL && \
				pgpInfo->keyDataLen == KEYRING_BUFSIZE ) );
	REQUIRES( errorInfo != NULL );

	/* Clear return value */
	*unhandledDataPresent = FALSE;

	/* Scan all of the objects in the keyset.  This is implemented as a 
	   sliding window that reads a certain amount of data into a lookahead 
	   buffer and then tries to identify a packet group in the buffer.  If 
	   we need to skip packets (for example due to unknown algorithms) we 
	   mark the keyset as read-only since it's no longer safe for us to 
	   write the incompletely-processed data to disk */
	sioctlSetString( stream, STREAM_IOCTL_IOBUFFER, streamBuffer, 
					 STREAM_BUFSIZE );
	for( moreData = TRUE, bufEnd = 0, iterationCount = 0;
		 ( moreData || bufEnd > 0 ) && \
			iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MAX;
		 iterationCount++ )
		{
		PGP_INFO *pgpInfoPtr = &pgpInfo[ keyGroupNo ];
		STREAM keyStream;
		int length = DUMMY_INIT;	/* Init needed by gcc */

		/* Fill the lookahead buffer:

			 buffer		 bufEnd			 bufSize
				|			|				|
				v			v				v
				+-----------+---------------+
				|///////////|				|
				+-----------+---------------+ 
							|
							+-- length --> */
		if( moreData )
			{
			REQUIRES( bufEnd >= 0 && bufEnd < bufSize );

			status = length = sread( stream, buffer + bufEnd,
									 bufSize - bufEnd );
			if( status <= 0 )
				{
				/* If we read nothing and there's nothing left in the buffer,
				   we're done */
				if( bufEnd <= 0 )
					{
					/* If we've previously read at least one group of key 
					   packets, we're OK */
					if( keyGroupNo > 0 )
						status = CRYPT_OK;
					return( status );
					}

				/* There's still data in the buffer, we can continue until 
				   we drain it */
				length = 0;
				}
			if( length < bufSize - bufEnd )
				{
				/* We didn't get as much as we requested, there's nothing
				   left to read */
				moreData = FALSE;
				}
			bufEnd += length;
			}

		/* Determine the size of the group of key packets in the buffer */
		sMemConnect( &keyStream, buffer, bufEnd );
		status = scanPacketGroup( &keyStream, &length, !moreData );
		sMemDisconnect( &keyStream );
		if( status == OK_SPECIAL )
			{
			/* Remember that we hit something that we couldn't process */
			*unhandledDataPresent = TRUE;

			/* If the packet group is contained within the buffer, remove 
			   the problem packets and continue */
			if( length <= bufEnd )
				{
				if( bufEnd - length > 0 )
					{
					REQUIRES( rangeCheck( length, bufEnd - length, 
										  bufSize ) );
					memmove( buffer, buffer + length, bufEnd - length );
					}
				bufEnd -= length;
				continue;
				}
			ENSURES( length > bufEnd );

			/* The packet group overflows the buffer, skip the remaining
			   contents and continue */
			status = sseek( stream, stell( stream ) + ( length - bufEnd ) );
			if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
				break;
			bufEnd = 0;
			continue;
			}
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			retExt( status,
					( status, errorInfo, 
					  "Couldn't parse key packet group %d", keyGroupNo ) );
			}
		if( length <= 0 )
			return( CRYPT_OK );

		/* Move the packet group from the keyring buffer to the key data */
		if( keyMatchInfo == NULL )
			{
			/* It's a read of all packets, allocate room for the current
			   packet group */
			if( ( pgpInfoPtr->keyData = \
								clAlloc( "readKeyring", length ) ) == NULL )
				return( CRYPT_ERROR_MEMORY );
			pgpInfoPtr->keyDataLen = length;
			}
		memcpy( pgpInfoPtr->keyData, buffer, length );
		if( bufEnd > length )
			{
			REQUIRES( rangeCheck( length, bufEnd - length, bufSize ) );
			memmove( buffer, buffer + length, bufEnd - length );
			}
		bufEnd -= length;

		/* Process the current packet group */
		sMemConnect( &keyStream, pgpInfoPtr->keyData, length );
		status = processPacketGroup( &keyStream, pgpInfoPtr, keyMatchInfo,
									 matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr, keyGroupNo, 
									 errorInfo );
		sMemDisconnect( &keyStream );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			/* If we were looking for a match for a particular key and 
			   didn't find it, continue */
			if( keyMatchInfo != NULL && status == CRYPT_ERROR_NOTFOUND )
				continue;

			/* If it's not a recoverable error, exit */
			if( status != OK_SPECIAL && status != CRYPT_ERROR_NOSECURE )
				return( status );

			/* Remember that we hit something that we couldn't process, and
			   optionally an (unusable) unprotected key */
			*unhandledDataPresent = TRUE;
			if( status == CRYPT_ERROR_NOSECURE )
				insecureKeys = TRUE;
			continue;
			}

		/* If we're looking for a particular key, we've found it */
		if( keyMatchInfo != NULL )
			return( CRYPT_OK );

		/* We're reading all keys, move on to the next empty slot.  Note 
		   that we only get to this point if we've been able to do something 
		   with the key, if not then the unhandledDataPresent flag is set 
		   without moving on to the next key group */
		keyGroupNo++;
		if( keyGroupNo >= maxNoPgpObjects )
			{
			retExt( CRYPT_ERROR_OVERFLOW, 
					( CRYPT_ERROR_OVERFLOW, errorInfo, 
					  "Maximum keyset object item count %d reached, no more "
					  "room to add further items", maxNoPgpObjects ) );
			}
		}
	ENSURES( iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MAX );

	/* If we were looking for a specific match, we haven't found it */
	if( keyMatchInfo != NULL )
		return( CRYPT_ERROR_NOTFOUND );

	/* If we haven't found any keys that we can use let the caller know.  
	   The error code to return here is a bit complex because we can skip 
	   keys either because there's something in the key data that we can't
	   process or because the keys aren't sufficiently protected for us to
	   trust them.  The most complex case is when both situations occur.  
	   To keep it simple, if there are any insecure keys then we report
	   CRYPT_ERROR_NOSECURE on the basis that if the keys had been 
	   appropriately secured then we might have been able to process them 
	   and return one */
	if( keyGroupNo <= 0 )
		{
		return( insecureKeys ? CRYPT_ERROR_NOSECURE : \
							   CRYPT_ERROR_NOTFOUND );
		}

	return( CRYPT_OK );
	}

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1, 2, 6 ) ) \
int pgpReadKeyring( INOUT STREAM *stream, 
					IN_ARRAY( maxNoPgpObjects ) PGP_INFO *pgpInfo, 
					IN_LENGTH_SHORT const int maxNoPgpObjects,
					IN_OPT const KEY_MATCH_INFO *keyMatchInfo,
					INOUT_OPT PGP_KEYINFO **matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr,
					INOUT ERROR_INFO *errorInfo )
	{
	BOOLEAN unhandledDataPresent;
	BYTE *buffer;
	int status;

	assert( isWritePtr( stream, sizeof( STREAM ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( pgpInfo, sizeof( PGP_INFO ) * maxNoPgpObjects ) );
	assert( ( keyMatchInfo == NULL && matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr == NULL ) || \
			( isReadPtr( keyMatchInfo, sizeof( KEY_MATCH_INFO ) ) && \
			  isWritePtr( matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr, sizeof( PGP_KEYINFO * ) ) ) );

	REQUIRES( maxNoPgpObjects >= 1 && maxNoPgpObjects < MAX_INTLENGTH_SHORT );
	REQUIRES( ( keyMatchInfo == NULL && matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr == NULL ) || \
			  ( keyMatchInfo != NULL && matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr != NULL && \
				pgpInfo->keyData != NULL && \
				pgpInfo->keyDataLen == KEYRING_BUFSIZE ) );
	REQUIRES( errorInfo != NULL );

	/* Clear the return value */
	if( matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr != NULL )
		*matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr = NULL;

	/* Since PGP keyrings just contain an arbitrary collection of packets 
	   concatenated together we can't tell in advance how much data we 
	   should be reading.  Because of this we have to set the file stream to 
	   allow partial reads without returning a read error */
	if( ( buffer = clAlloc( "readKeyring", KEYRING_BUFSIZE ) ) == NULL )
		return( CRYPT_ERROR_MEMORY );
	sioctlSet( stream, STREAM_IOCTL_PARTIALREAD, TRUE );
	status = processKeyringPackets( stream, pgpInfo, maxNoPgpObjects, 
									buffer, KEYRING_BUFSIZE, 
									keyMatchInfo, matchedKeyInfoPtrPtr, 
									&unhandledDataPresent, errorInfo );
	sioctlSet( stream, STREAM_IOCTL_IOBUFFER, 0 );
	clFree( "readKeyring", buffer );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( status );

	/* If we couldn't process one or more packets let the caller know that 
	   not all keyring data is present in memory */
	return( unhandledDataPresent ? OK_SPECIAL : CRYPT_OK );
	}
#endif /* USE_PGPKEYS */
