/****************************************************************************
*																			*
*					 cryptlib PGP De-enveloping Routines					*
*					 Copyright Peter Gutmann 1996-2008						*
*																			*
****************************************************************************/

#if defined( INC_ALL )
  #include "pgp_rw.h"
  #include "envelope.h"
#else
  #include "enc_dec/pgp_rw.h"
  #include "envelope/envelope.h"
#endif /* Compiler-specific includes */

#ifdef USE_PGP

/****************************************************************************
*																			*
*								Utility Routines							*
*																			*
****************************************************************************/

/* Sanity-check the envelope state */

CHECK_RETVAL_BOOL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1 ) ) \
static BOOLEAN sanityCheck( const ENVELOPE_INFO *envelopeInfoPtr )
	{
	/* Make sure that general envelope state is in order */
	if( !( envelopeInfoPtr->flags & ENVELOPE_ISDEENVELOPE ) )
		return( FALSE );
	if( envelopeInfoPtr->pgpDeenvState < PGP_DEENVSTATE_NONE || \
		envelopeInfoPtr->pgpDeenvState >= PGP_DEENVSTATE_LAST )
		return( FALSE );

	/* Make sure that the buffer position is within bounds */
	if( envelopeInfoPtr->buffer == NULL || \
		envelopeInfoPtr->bufPos < 0 || \
		envelopeInfoPtr->bufPos > envelopeInfoPtr->bufSize || \
		envelopeInfoPtr->bufSize < MIN_BUFFER_SIZE || \
		envelopeInfoPtr->bufSize >= MAX_INTLENGTH )
		return( FALSE );

	/* Make sure that the payload size is within bounds */
	if( envelopeInfoPtr->payloadSize != CRYPT_UNUSED && \
		( envelopeInfoPtr->payloadSize < 0 || \
		  envelopeInfoPtr->payloadSize >= MAX_INTLENGTH ) )
		return( FALSE );

	/* Make sure that the out-of-band buffer state is OK.  The oobDataLeft 
	   value is the general size of a data packet header plus the maximum 
	   possible length for the variable-length filename portion */
	if( envelopeInfoPtr->oobEventCount < 0 || \
		envelopeInfoPtr->oobEventCount > 10 || \
		envelopeInfoPtr->oobDataLeft < 0 || \
		envelopeInfoPtr->oobDataLeft >= 32 + 256 )
		return( FALSE );

	/* Make sure that the packet data information is within bounds */
	if( envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize < 0 || \
		envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize >= MAX_INTLENGTH || \
		envelopeInfoPtr->dataLeft < 0 || \
		envelopeInfoPtr->dataLeft >= MAX_INTLENGTH )
		return( FALSE );

	return( TRUE );
	}

/* Get information on a PGP data packet.  If the isIndefinite value is 
   present then an indefinite length (i.e. partial packet lengths) is 
   permitted, otherwise it isn't.  If the allowDummyPackets flag is set then
   we allow shorter-than-normal dummy packets (PGP_PACKET_MARKER), otherwise
   we enforce a sensible minimum packet size */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1, 2, 3, 4 ) ) \
static int getPacketInfo( INOUT STREAM *stream, 
						  INOUT ENVELOPE_INFO *envelopeInfoPtr,
						  OUT_ENUM_OPT( PGP_PACKET ) PGP_PACKET_TYPE *packetType, 
						  OUT_LENGTH_Z long *length, 
						  OUT_OPT_BOOL BOOLEAN *isIndefinite,
						  IN_LENGTH_SHORT int minPacketSize )
	{
	int ctb, version, status;

	assert( isWritePtr( stream, sizeof( STREAM ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( envelopeInfoPtr, sizeof( ENVELOPE_INFO ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( packetType, sizeof( PGP_PACKET_TYPE ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( length, sizeof( long ) ) );
	assert( isIndefinite == NULL || \
			isWritePtr( isIndefinite, sizeof( BOOLEAN ) ) );

	ENSURES( minPacketSize > 0 && minPacketSize < MAX_INTLENGTH_SHORT );

	/* Clear return values */
	*packetType = PGP_PACKET_NONE;
	*length = 0;
	if( isIndefinite != NULL )
		*isIndefinite = FALSE;

	/* Read the packet header and extract information from the CTB.  The 
	   assignment of version numbers is a bit complicated since it's 
	   possible to use PGP 2.x packet headers to wrap up OpenPGP packets, 
	   and in fact a number of apps mix version numbers.  We treat the 
	   version to report as the highest one that we find */
	if( isIndefinite != NULL )
		status = pgpReadPacketHeaderI( stream, &ctb, length, minPacketSize );
	else
		status = pgpReadPacketHeader( stream, &ctb, length, minPacketSize );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		{
		if( status != OK_SPECIAL )
			return( status );
		ENSURES( isIndefinite != NULL );

		/* Remember that the packet uses an indefinite-length encoding */
		envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags &= ~ENVDATA_NOSEGMENT;
		*isIndefinite = TRUE;
		}
	version = pgpGetPacketVersion( ctb );
	if( version > envelopeInfoPtr->version )
		envelopeInfoPtr->version = version;
	*packetType = pgpGetPacketType( ctb );

	/* Extract and return the packet type */
	return( CRYPT_OK );
	}

/****************************************************************************
*																			*
*						Read Key Exchange/Signature Packets					*
*																			*
****************************************************************************/

/* Add information about an object to an envelope's content information list */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1 ) ) \
static int addContentListItem( INOUT ENVELOPE_INFO *envelopeInfoPtr,
							   INOUT_OPT STREAM *stream,
							   const BOOLEAN isContinuedSignature )
	{
	QUERY_INFO queryInfo;
	CONTENT_LIST *contentListItem;
	void *object = NULL;
	int objectSize = 0, status;

	assert( isWritePtr( envelopeInfoPtr, sizeof( ENVELOPE_INFO ) ) );
	assert( ( stream == NULL && \
			  envelopeInfoPtr->actionList == NULL && \
			  envelopeInfoPtr->contentList == NULL ) || \
			isWritePtr( stream, sizeof( STREAM ) ) );

	REQUIRES( ( stream == NULL && \
				envelopeInfoPtr->actionList == NULL && \
				envelopeInfoPtr->contentList == NULL ) || \
			  ( stream != NULL ) );

	/* Make sure that there's room to add another list item */
	if( !moreContentItemsPossible( envelopeInfoPtr->contentList ) )
		return( CRYPT_ERROR_OVERFLOW );

	/* PGP 2.x password-encrypted data is detected by the absence of any
	   other keying object rather than by finding a concrete object type so
	   if we're passed a null stream we add a password pseudo-object */
	if( stream == NULL )
		{
		CONTENT_ENCR_INFO *encrInfo;

		status = createContentListItem( &contentListItem, 
										envelopeInfoPtr->memPoolState,
										CONTENT_CRYPT, CRYPT_FORMAT_PGP, 
										NULL, 0 );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			return( status );
		encrInfo = &contentListItem->clEncrInfo;
		contentListItem->envInfo = CRYPT_ENVINFO_PASSWORD;
		encrInfo->cryptAlgo = CRYPT_ALGO_IDEA;
		encrInfo->cryptMode = CRYPT_MODE_CFB;
		encrInfo->keySetupAlgo = CRYPT_ALGO_MD5;
		status = appendContentListItem( envelopeInfoPtr, contentListItem );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			clFree( "addContentListItem", contentListItem );
			return( status );
			}
		return( CRYPT_OK );
		}

	/* Find the size of the object, allocate a buffer for it if necessary,
	   and copy it across.  This call verifies that all of the object data 
	   is present in the stream so in theory we don't have to check the 
	   following reads, but we check them anyway just to be sure */
	status = queryPgpObject( stream, &queryInfo );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( status );
	if( queryInfo.type == CRYPT_OBJECT_SIGNATURE && \
		queryInfo.dataStart <= 0 )
		{
		ENSURES( !isContinuedSignature );

		/* It's a one-pass signature packet, the signature information 
		   follows in another packet that will be added later */
		status = sSkip( stream, ( int ) queryInfo.size );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			return( status );
		}
	else
		{
		objectSize = ( int ) queryInfo.size;
		if( ( object = clAlloc( "addContentListItem", \
								objectSize ) ) == NULL )
			return( CRYPT_ERROR_MEMORY );
		status = sread( stream, object, objectSize );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			clFree( "addContentListItem", object );
			return( status );
			}
		}

	/* If it's the rest of the signature data from a one-pass signature,
	   locate the first half of the signature info and complete the
	   information.  In theory this could get ugly because there could be
	   multiple one-pass signature packets present but PGP handles multiple 
	   signatures by nesting them so this isn't a problem */
	if( isContinuedSignature )
		{
		int iterationCount;
		
		for( contentListItem = envelopeInfoPtr->contentList, \
				iterationCount = 0;
			 contentListItem != NULL && \
				contentListItem->envInfo != CRYPT_ENVINFO_SIGNATURE && \
				iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MED;
			 contentListItem = contentListItem->next, iterationCount++ );
		ENSURES( iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MED );
		ENSURES( contentListItem != NULL && \
				 contentListItem->object == NULL && \
				 contentListItem->objectSize == 0 );

		/* Consistency check, make sure that the hash algorithm and key ID 
		   that we've been working with match what's in the signature */
		if( contentListItem->clSigInfo.hashAlgo != queryInfo.hashAlgo || \
			contentListItem->keyIDsize != queryInfo.keyIDlength || \
			memcmp( contentListItem->keyID, queryInfo.keyID, 
					queryInfo.keyIDlength ) )
			{
			clFree( "addContentListItem", object );
			return( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA );
			}

		/* We've got the right content list entry, point it to the newly-
		   acquired signature data */
		contentListItem->object = object;
		contentListItem->objectSize = objectSize;
		}
	else
		{
		/* Allocate memory for the new content list item and copy information
		   on the item across */
		status = createContentListItem( &contentListItem, 
							envelopeInfoPtr->memPoolState, 
							( queryInfo.type == CRYPT_OBJECT_SIGNATURE ) ? \
								CONTENT_SIGNATURE : CONTENT_CRYPT, 
							CRYPT_FORMAT_PGP, object, objectSize );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			if( object != NULL )
				clFree( "addContentListItem", object );
			return( status );
			}
		}
	if( queryInfo.type == CRYPT_OBJECT_PKCENCRYPTED_KEY || \
		queryInfo.type == CRYPT_OBJECT_SIGNATURE )
		{
		/* Remember details of the enveloping info that we require to 
		   continue */
		if( queryInfo.type == CRYPT_OBJECT_PKCENCRYPTED_KEY )
			{
			CONTENT_ENCR_INFO *encrInfo = &contentListItem->clEncrInfo;

			contentListItem->envInfo = CRYPT_ENVINFO_PRIVATEKEY;
			encrInfo->cryptAlgo = queryInfo.cryptAlgo;
			}
		else
			{
			CONTENT_SIG_INFO *sigInfo = &contentListItem->clSigInfo;

			contentListItem->envInfo = CRYPT_ENVINFO_SIGNATURE;
			sigInfo->hashAlgo = queryInfo.hashAlgo;
			if( queryInfo.attributeStart > 0 )
				{
				REQUIRES( rangeCheck( queryInfo.attributeStart, 
									  queryInfo.attributeLength, 
									  objectSize ) );
				sigInfo->extraData = \
								( BYTE * ) contentListItem->object + \
										   queryInfo.attributeStart;
				sigInfo->extraDataLength = queryInfo.attributeLength;
				}
			if( queryInfo.unauthAttributeStart > 0 )
				{
				REQUIRES( rangeCheck( queryInfo.unauthAttributeStart, 
									  queryInfo.unauthAttributeLength, 
									  objectSize ) );
				sigInfo->extraData2 = \
								( BYTE * ) contentListItem->object + \
										   queryInfo.unauthAttributeStart;
				sigInfo->extraData2Length = queryInfo.unauthAttributeLength;
				}
			}
		REQUIRES( queryInfo.keyIDlength > 0 && \
				  queryInfo.keyIDlength <= CRYPT_MAX_HASHSIZE );
		memcpy( contentListItem->keyID, queryInfo.keyID, 
				queryInfo.keyIDlength );
		contentListItem->keyIDsize = queryInfo.keyIDlength;
		if( queryInfo.iAndSStart > 0 )
			{
			REQUIRES( rangeCheck( queryInfo.iAndSStart, 
								  queryInfo.iAndSLength, objectSize ) );
			contentListItem->issuerAndSerialNumber = \
				( BYTE * ) contentListItem->object + queryInfo.iAndSStart;
			contentListItem->issuerAndSerialNumberSize = queryInfo.iAndSLength;
			}
		}
	if( queryInfo.type == CRYPT_OBJECT_ENCRYPTED_KEY )
		{
		CONTENT_ENCR_INFO *encrInfo = &contentListItem->clEncrInfo;

		/* Remember details of the enveloping info that we require to 
		   continue */
		if( queryInfo.keySetupAlgo != CRYPT_ALGO_NONE )
			{
			contentListItem->envInfo = CRYPT_ENVINFO_PASSWORD;
			encrInfo->keySetupAlgo = queryInfo.keySetupAlgo;
			encrInfo->keySetupIterations = queryInfo.keySetupIterations;
			REQUIRES( queryInfo.saltLength > 0 && \
					  queryInfo.saltLength <= CRYPT_MAX_IVSIZE );
			memcpy( encrInfo->saltOrIV, queryInfo.salt, 
					queryInfo.saltLength );
			encrInfo->saltOrIVsize = queryInfo.saltLength;
			}
		else
			contentListItem->envInfo = CRYPT_ENVINFO_KEY;
		encrInfo->cryptAlgo = queryInfo.cryptAlgo;
		encrInfo->cryptMode = CRYPT_MODE_CFB;
		}
	if( queryInfo.dataStart > 0 )
		{
		REQUIRES( rangeCheck( queryInfo.dataStart, queryInfo.dataLength, 
							  objectSize ) );
		contentListItem->payload = \
			( BYTE * ) contentListItem->object + queryInfo.dataStart;
		contentListItem->payloadSize = queryInfo.dataLength;
		}
	if( queryInfo.version > envelopeInfoPtr->version )
		envelopeInfoPtr->version = queryInfo.version;

	/* If we're completing the read of the data in a one-pass signature
	   packet, we're done */
	if( isContinuedSignature )
		return( CRYPT_OK );

	/* If it's signed data, create a hash action to process it.  Because PGP 
	   only applies one level of signing per packet nesting level we don't 
	   have to worry that this will add redundant hash actions as there'll 
	   only ever be one */
	if( queryInfo.type == CRYPT_OBJECT_SIGNATURE )
		{
		MESSAGE_CREATEOBJECT_INFO createInfo;

		REQUIRES( moreActionsPossible( envelopeInfoPtr->actionList ) );

		/* Append a new hash action to the action list */
		setMessageCreateObjectInfo( &createInfo,
									contentListItem->clSigInfo.hashAlgo );
		status = krnlSendMessage( SYSTEM_OBJECT_HANDLE,
								  IMESSAGE_DEV_CREATEOBJECT, &createInfo, 
								  OBJECT_TYPE_CONTEXT );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			deleteContentList( envelopeInfoPtr->memPoolState, 
							   &contentListItem );
			return( status );
			}
		status = addAction( &envelopeInfoPtr->actionList, 
							envelopeInfoPtr->memPoolState, ACTION_HASH,
							createInfo.cryptHandle );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			krnlSendNotifier( createInfo.cryptHandle, 
							  IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT );
			deleteContentList( envelopeInfoPtr->memPoolState, 
							   &contentListItem );
			return( status );
			}
		}
	status = appendContentListItem( envelopeInfoPtr, contentListItem );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		{
		deleteContentList( envelopeInfoPtr->memPoolState, 
						   &contentListItem );
		return( status );
		}

	return( CRYPT_OK );
	}

/****************************************************************************
*																			*
*							Header Processing Routines						*
*																			*
****************************************************************************/

/* Process the header of a packet */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1, 2, 3 ) ) \
static int processPacketHeader( INOUT ENVELOPE_INFO *envelopeInfoPtr, 
								INOUT STREAM *stream, 
								INOUT_ENUM( PGP_DEENVSTATE ) \
									PGP_DEENV_STATE *state )
	{
	const int streamPos = stell( stream );
	PGP_PACKET_TYPE packetType;
	BOOLEAN isIndefinite;
	long packetLength;
	int value, status;

	assert( isWritePtr( envelopeInfoPtr, sizeof( ENVELOPE_INFO ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( stream, sizeof( STREAM ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( state, sizeof( PGP_DEENV_STATE ) ) );

	REQUIRES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );
	REQUIRES( streamPos >= 0 && streamPos < MAX_INTLENGTH );

	/* Read the PGP packet type and figure out what we've got.  If we're at
	   the start of the data we allow noise packets like PGP_PACKET_MARKER
	   (with a length of 3), otherwise we only allow standard packets */
	status = getPacketInfo( stream, envelopeInfoPtr, &packetType, 
							&packetLength, &isIndefinite,
							( *state == PGP_DEENVSTATE_NONE ) ? 3 : 8 );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		{
		retExt( status,
				( status, ENVELOPE_ERRINFO,
				  "Invalid PGP packet header" ) );
		}

	/* Process as much of the header as we can and move on to the next state.  
	   Since PGP uses sequential discrete packets, if we encounter any of 
	   the non-payload packet types we stay in the initial "none" state 
	   because we don't know what's next */
	switch( packetType )
		{
		case PGP_PACKET_DATA:
			{
			int length;

			/* Skip the content-type, filename, and date */
			sSkip( stream, 1 );
			status = length = sgetc( stream );
			if( !cryptStatusError( status ) )
				status = sSkip( stream, length + 4 );
			if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
				{
				retExt( status,
						( status, ENVELOPE_ERRINFO,
						  "Invalid PGP data packet start" ) );
				}

			/* Remember that this is a pure data packet, record the content 
			   length (if we have the necessary information), and move on to 
			   the payload */
			envelopeInfoPtr->contentType = CRYPT_CONTENT_DATA;
			if( !isIndefinite )
				{
				const long payloadSize = \
					packetLength - ( 1 + 1 + length + 4 );
				if( payloadSize < 1 || payloadSize > MAX_INTLENGTH )
					return( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA );
				envelopeInfoPtr->payloadSize = payloadSize;
				}
			*state = PGP_DEENVSTATE_DATA;
			break;
			}

		case PGP_PACKET_COPR:
			if( envelopeInfoPtr->usage != ACTION_NONE )
				return( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA );
			envelopeInfoPtr->usage = ACTION_COMPRESS;
#ifdef USE_COMPRESSION
			value = sgetc( stream );
			if( cryptStatusError( value ) )
				return( value );
			switch( value )
				{
				case PGP_ALGO_ZIP:
					/* PGP 2.x has a funny compression level based on DOS 
					   memory limits (13-bit windows) and no zlib header 
					   (because it uses very old InfoZIP code).  Setting the 
					   windowSize to a negative value has the undocumented 
					   effect of not reading zlib headers */
					if( inflateInit2( &envelopeInfoPtr->zStream, -13 ) != Z_OK )
						return( CRYPT_ERROR_MEMORY );
					break;

				case PGP_ALGO_ZLIB:
					/* Standard zlib compression */
					if( inflateInit( &envelopeInfoPtr->zStream ) != Z_OK )
						return( CRYPT_ERROR_MEMORY );
					break;

				default:
					return( CRYPT_ERROR_NOTAVAIL );
				}
			envelopeInfoPtr->flags |= ENVELOPE_ZSTREAMINITED;
			if( packetLength != CRYPT_UNUSED )
				{
				const long payloadSize = packetLength - 1;

				/* Most implementations use the PGP 2.x "keep going until 
				   you run out of data" non-length encoding that's neither
				   a definite- nor an indefinite length, but it's possible
				   that something somewhere will use a proper definite 
				   length so we accomodate this here */
				if( payloadSize < 1 || payloadSize > MAX_INTLENGTH )
					return( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA );
				envelopeInfoPtr->payloadSize = payloadSize;
				}
			else
				{
				/* Remember that we have no length information available for 
				   the payload */
				envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags |= ENVDATA_NOLENGTHINFO;
				}
			*state = PGP_DEENVSTATE_DATA;
			break;
#else
			return( CRYPT_ERROR_NOTAVAIL );
#endif /* USE_COMPRESSION */

		case PGP_PACKET_SKE:
		case PGP_PACKET_PKE:
			/* Read the SKE/PKE packet */
			if( envelopeInfoPtr->usage != ACTION_NONE && \
				envelopeInfoPtr->usage != ACTION_CRYPT )
				return( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA );
			envelopeInfoPtr->usage = ACTION_CRYPT;
			sseek( stream, streamPos );	/* Reset to start of packet */
			status = addContentListItem( envelopeInfoPtr, stream, FALSE );
			if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
				{
				retExt( status,
						( status, ENVELOPE_ERRINFO,
						  "Invalid PGP %s packet", 
						  ( packetType == PGP_PACKET_SKE ) ? "SKE" : "PKE" ) );
				}
			break;

		case PGP_PACKET_SIGNATURE:
		case PGP_PACKET_SIGNATURE_ONEPASS:
			/* Try and guess whether this is a standalone signature.  This 
			   is rather difficult since unlike S/MIME there's no way to 
			   tell whether a PGP signature packet is part of other data or 
			   a standalone item.  The best that we can do is assume that if 
			   the caller added a hash action and we find a signature then 
			   it's a detached signature.  Unfortunately there's no way to 
			   tell whether a signature packet with no user-supplied hash is 
			   a standalone signature or the start of further signed data so 
			   we can't handle detached signatures where the user doesn't 
			   supply the hash */
			if( envelopeInfoPtr->usage == ACTION_SIGN && \
				envelopeInfoPtr->actionList != NULL && \
				envelopeInfoPtr->actionList->action == ACTION_HASH )
				{
				/* We can't have a detached signature packet as a one-pass 
				   signature */
				if( packetType == PGP_PACKET_SIGNATURE_ONEPASS )
					{
					retExt( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA,
							( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA, ENVELOPE_ERRINFO,
							  "PGP detached signature can't be a one-pass "
							  "signature packet" ) );
					}
				envelopeInfoPtr->flags |= ENVELOPE_DETACHED_SIG;
				}

			/* Read the signature/signature information packet.  We allow 
			   the usage to be set already if we find a signature packet 
			   since it could have been preceded by a one-pass signature 
			   packet or be a detached signature */
			if( envelopeInfoPtr->usage != ACTION_NONE && \
				!( packetType == PGP_PACKET_SIGNATURE && \
				   envelopeInfoPtr->usage == ACTION_SIGN ) )
				return( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA );
			envelopeInfoPtr->usage = ACTION_SIGN;
			sseek( stream, streamPos );	/* Reset to start of packet */
			status = addContentListItem( envelopeInfoPtr, stream, FALSE );
			if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
				{
				retExt( status,
						( status, ENVELOPE_ERRINFO,
						  "Invalid PGP %s signature packet",
						  ( packetType == PGP_PACKET_SIGNATURE_ONEPASS ) ? \
							"one-pass" : "" ) );
				}
			if( envelopeInfoPtr->flags & ENVELOPE_DETACHED_SIG )
				{
				/* If it's a one-pass signature there's no payload present 
				   so we can go straight to the postdata state */
				envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags |= ENVDATA_HASHACTIONSACTIVE;
				envelopeInfoPtr->payloadSize = 0;
				*state = PGP_DEENVSTATE_DONE;
				}
			else
				*state = PGP_DEENVSTATE_DATA;
			break;

		case PGP_PACKET_ENCR_MDC:
			/* The encrypted-data-with-MDC packet is preceded by a version 
			   number */
			status = value = sgetc( stream );
			if( !cryptStatusError( status ) && value != 1 )
				status = CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA;
			if( !cryptStatusError( status ) )
				{
				/* Adjust the length for the version number and make sure 
				   that what's left is valid.  In theory this check isn't
				   necessary because getPacketInfo() has enforced a minimum
				   length, but we do it anyway just to be sure */
				packetLength--;
				if( packetLength <= 0 || packetLength > MAX_INTLENGTH )
					status = CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA;
				}
			if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
				{
				retExt( status,
						( status, ENVELOPE_ERRINFO,
						  "Invalid MDC packet header" ) );
				}
			/* Fall through */

		case PGP_PACKET_ENCR:
			if( envelopeInfoPtr->usage != ACTION_NONE && \
				envelopeInfoPtr->usage != ACTION_CRYPT )
				return( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA );
			if( !isIndefinite )
				envelopeInfoPtr->payloadSize = packetLength;
			envelopeInfoPtr->usage = ACTION_CRYPT;
			*state = ( packetType == PGP_PACKET_ENCR_MDC ) ? \
					 PGP_DEENVSTATE_ENCR_MDC : PGP_DEENVSTATE_ENCR;
			break;

		case PGP_PACKET_MARKER:
			/* Obsolete marker packet, skip it */
			return( sSkip( stream, packetLength ) );
		
		default:
			/* Unrecognised/invalid packet type */
			retExt( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA,
					( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA, ENVELOPE_ERRINFO,
					  "Unrecognised PGP packet type %d", packetType ) );
		}

	ENSURES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );

	return( CRYPT_OK );
	}

/* PGP doesn't provide any indication of what the content of the packet's 
   encrypted payload is so we have to burrow down into the encrypted data to 
   see whether the payload needs any further processing.  To do this we look 
   ahead into the data to see whether we need to strip the header (for a 
   plain data packet) or inform the user that there's a nested content type.  
   This process is complicated by the fact that there are various ways of 
   representing the length information for both outer and inner packets and 
   the fact that the payload can consist of more than one packet, but we're 
   really only interested in the first one in most cases.  The calculation 
   of the encapsulated payload length is as follows:

	+---+---+............................................
	|len|hdr|											: Encrypted data
	+---+---+............................................
			:											:
			+---+---+-------------------------------+---+
			|len|hdr|			Payload				| ? | Inner content
			+---+---+-------------------------------+---+

   Definite payload length:
		Payload = (inner) length - (inner) hdr.

   Unknown length (only allowed for compressed data): 
		Payload = (leave as is since by definition the compressed data 
				   extends to EOF).

   Indefinite payload length: 
		Payload = to EOC, handled by decode.c routines */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1, 2 ) ) \
static int processPacketDataHeader( INOUT ENVELOPE_INFO *envelopeInfoPtr,
									OUT_ENUM_OPT( PGP_DEENVSTATE ) \
										PGP_DEENV_STATE *state )
	{
	static const MAP_TABLE typeMapTbl[] = {
		{ PGP_PACKET_COPR, CRYPT_CONTENT_COMPRESSEDDATA },
		{ PGP_PACKET_ENCR, CRYPT_CONTENT_ENCRYPTEDDATA },
		{ PGP_PACKET_ENCR_MDC, CRYPT_CONTENT_ENCRYPTEDDATA },
		{ PGP_PACKET_SKE, CRYPT_CONTENT_ENCRYPTEDDATA },
		{ PGP_PACKET_PKE, CRYPT_CONTENT_ENVELOPEDDATA },
		{ PGP_PACKET_SIGNATURE, CRYPT_CONTENT_SIGNEDDATA },
		{ PGP_PACKET_SIGNATURE_ONEPASS, CRYPT_CONTENT_SIGNEDDATA },
		{ CRYPT_ERROR, CRYPT_ERROR }, { CRYPT_ERROR, CRYPT_ERROR }
		};
	STREAM headerStream;
	BYTE buffer[ 32 + 256 + 8 ];	/* Max.data packet header size */
	PGP_PACKET_TYPE packetType;
	long packetLength;
	int value, length, status;

	assert( isWritePtr( envelopeInfoPtr, sizeof( ENVELOPE_INFO ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( state, sizeof( PGP_DEENV_STATE ) ) );
	
	REQUIRES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );
	REQUIRES( envelopeInfoPtr->oobDataLeft < 32 + 256 );

	/* If we're down to stripping raw header data, remove it from the buffer
	   and exit */
	if( envelopeInfoPtr->oobEventCount <= 0 )
		{
		status = envelopeInfoPtr->copyFromEnvelopeFunction( envelopeInfoPtr,
										buffer, envelopeInfoPtr->oobDataLeft, 
										&length, ENVCOPY_FLAG_NONE );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			return( status );
		if( length < envelopeInfoPtr->oobDataLeft )
			return( CRYPT_ERROR_UNDERFLOW );

		/* We've successfully stripped all of the out-of-band data, clear the
		   data counter.  If it's compressed data (which doesn't have a 1:1 
		   correspondence between input and output and which has an unknown-
		   length encoding so there's no length information to adjust), 
		   exit */
		envelopeInfoPtr->oobDataLeft = 0;
		if( envelopeInfoPtr->usage == ACTION_COMPRESS )
			{
			*state = PGP_DEENVSTATE_DONE;

			ENSURES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );

			return( CRYPT_OK );
			}

		/* Adjust the current data count by what we've removed.  The reason 
		   we have to do this is because segmentSize records the amount of
		   data copied in (rather than out, as we've done here) but since it 
		   was copied directly into the envelope buffer as part of the 
		   header-processing rather than via copyToDeenvelope() (which is
		   what usually adjusts segmentSize for us) we have to manually 
		   adjust the value here */
		if( envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize > 0 )
			{
			envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize -= length;
			ENSURES( envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize >= 0 && \
					 envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize < MAX_INTLENGTH );

			/* If we've reached the end of the data (i.e. the entire current 
			   segment is contained within the data present in the buffer) 
			   remember that what's left still needs to be processed (e.g. 
			   hashed in the case of signed data) on the way out */
			if( envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize <= envelopeInfoPtr->bufPos )
				{
				envelopeInfoPtr->dataLeft = envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize;
				envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize = 0;
				}
			}

		/* We've processed the header, if this is signed data we start 
		   hashing from this point (the PGP RFCs are wrong in this regard, 
		   only the payload is hashed and not the entire packet) */
		if( envelopeInfoPtr->usage == ACTION_SIGN )
			envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags |= ENVDATA_HASHACTIONSACTIVE;

		/* We're done */
		*state = PGP_DEENVSTATE_DONE;

		ENSURES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );
		return( CRYPT_OK );
		}

	/* We have to perform all sorts of special-case processing to handle the 
	   out-of-band packet header at the start of the payload.  Initially, we 
	   need to find out how much header data is actually present.  The header 
	   for a plain data packet consists of:

		byte	ctb
		byte[]	length
		byte	type = 'b' | 't'
		byte	filename length
		byte[]	filename
		byte[4]	timestamp

	   The smallest size for this header (1-byte length, no filename) is 
	   1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 4 = 8 bytes.  This is also just enough to get us to 
	   the filename length for a maximum-size header, which is 1 + 5 + 1 + 1 
	   bytes up to the filename length and covers the type + length range 
	   of every other packet type, which can be from 1 to 1 + 5 bytes.  Thus 
	   we read 8 bytes, setting the OOB data flag to indicate that this is a 
	   read-ahead read that doesn't remove data from the buffer */
	status = envelopeInfoPtr->copyFromEnvelopeFunction( envelopeInfoPtr,
														buffer, 8, &length,
														ENVCOPY_FLAG_OOBDATA );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( status );
	if( length < 8 )
		return( CRYPT_ERROR_UNDERFLOW );

	/* Read the header information and see what we've got */
	sMemConnect( &headerStream, buffer, length );
	status = getPacketInfo( &headerStream, envelopeInfoPtr, &packetType,
							&packetLength, NULL, 8 );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		{
		sMemDisconnect( &headerStream );
		return( status );
		}

	/* Remember the total data packet size unless it's compressed data, 
	   which doesn't have a 1:1 correspondence between input and output */
	if( envelopeInfoPtr->usage != ACTION_COMPRESS )
		{
/******/
/* All of this only for definite-length packets or indefinite + EOC-seen */
/******/
		/* If it's a definite-length packet, use the overall packet size.  
		   This also skips any MDC packets that may be attached to the end 
		   of the plaintext */
		if( packetLength != CRYPT_UNUSED )
			{
			envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize = stell( &headerStream ) + \
										   packetLength;

			/* If we're using the definite-length encoding (which is the 
			   default for PGP) then the overall payload size is equal to 
			   the segment size */
			if( envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags & ENVDATA_NOSEGMENT )
				envelopeInfoPtr->payloadSize = envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize;
			}
		else
			{
			ENSURES( packetType == PGP_PACKET_COPR );
			ENSURES( envelopeInfoPtr->payloadSize != CRYPT_UNUSED );

			/* It's an arbitrary-length compressed data packet, use the
			   length that we got earlier from the outer packet */
			if( envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags & ENVDATA_ENDOFCONTENTS )
				{
/******/
/* What happens in this case? */
/******/
				DEBUG_DIAG(( "Found EOC for unknown-length compressed "
							 "data" ));
				assert( DEBUG_WARN );
				}
			else
				{
				envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize = envelopeInfoPtr->payloadSize;

				/* If we've reached the end of the data (i.e. the entire 
				   current segment is contained within the data present in 
				   the buffer) remember that what's left still needs to be 
				   processed (e.g. hashed in the case of signed data) on the 
				   way out */
				if( envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize <= envelopeInfoPtr->bufPos )
					{
					envelopeInfoPtr->dataLeft = envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize;
					envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize = 0;
					}
				}
			}
		}

	/* If it's a literal data packet, parse it so that we can strip it from 
	   the data that we return to the caller.  We know that the reads can't
	   fail because the readahead read has confirmed that there are at least
	   8 bytes available, but we check anyway just to be sure */
	if( packetType == PGP_PACKET_DATA )
		{
		int extraLen;

		( void ) sgetc( &headerStream );	/* Skip content type */
		status = extraLen = sgetc( &headerStream );
		if( !cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			envelopeInfoPtr->oobDataLeft = stell( &headerStream ) + \
										   extraLen + 4;
			}
		sMemDisconnect( &headerStream );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			return( status );

		/* Remember that this is a pure data packet */
		envelopeInfoPtr->contentType = CRYPT_CONTENT_DATA;

		/* We've processed enough of the header to know what to do next, 
		   move on to the next sub-state where we just consume all of the 
		   input.  This has to be done as a sub-state within the 
		   PGP_DEENVSTATE_DATA_HEADER state since we can encounter a
		   (recoverable) error between reading the out-of-band data header
		   and reading the out-of-band data itself */
		envelopeInfoPtr->oobEventCount--;

		ENSURES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );

		return( CRYPT_OK );
		}

	sMemDisconnect( &headerStream );

	/* If it's a known packet type, indicate it as the nested content type */
	status = mapValue( packetType, &value, typeMapTbl, 
					   FAILSAFE_ARRAYSIZE( typeMapTbl, MAP_TABLE ) );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA );
	envelopeInfoPtr->contentType = value;

#if 0	/* 12/4/06 See previous comment */
	/* If it's not compressed data (which doesn't have a 1:1 correspondence 
	   between input and output) and we've reached the end of the data (i.e. 
	   the entire current segment is contained within the data present in 
	   the buffer), remember that what's left still needs to be processed 
	   (e.g. hashed in the case of signed data) on the way out */
	if( envelopeInfoPtr->usage != ACTION_COMPRESS && \
		envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize <= envelopeInfoPtr->bufPos )
		{
		envelopeInfoPtr->dataLeft = envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize;
		envelopeInfoPtr->segmentSize = 0;
		}
#endif /* 0 */

	/* Don't try and process the content any further */
	envelopeInfoPtr->oobEventCount = envelopeInfoPtr->oobDataLeft = 0;
	*state = PGP_DEENVSTATE_DONE;

	ENSURES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );

	return( CRYPT_OK );
	}

/* Process the start of an encrypted data packet */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1, 2 ) ) \
static int processEncryptedPacket( INOUT ENVELOPE_INFO *envelopeInfoPtr, 
								   INOUT STREAM *stream, 
								   IN_ENUM( PGP_DEENVSTATE ) \
									const PGP_DEENV_STATE state )
	{
	BYTE ivInfoBuffer[ CRYPT_MAX_IVSIZE + 2 + 8 ];
	int ivSize, offset, status;

	assert( isWritePtr( envelopeInfoPtr, sizeof( ENVELOPE_INFO ) ) );
	assert( isWritePtr( stream, sizeof( STREAM ) ) );
	
	REQUIRES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );
	REQUIRES( state > PGP_DEENVSTATE_NONE && state < PGP_DEENVSTATE_LAST );

	/* If there aren't any non-session-key keying resource objects present 
	   then we can't go any further until we get a session key */
	if( envelopeInfoPtr->actionList == NULL )
		{
		/* There's no session key object present, add a pseudo-object that 
		   takes the place of the (password-derived) session key object in 
		   the content list.  This can only occur for PGP 2.x conventionally-
		   encrypted data, which didn't encode any algorithm information 
		   with the data, so if we get to this point we know that we've hit 
		   data encrypted with the default IDEA/CFB encryption algorithm 
		   derived from a user password using the default MD5 hash 
		   algorithm */
		if( envelopeInfoPtr->contentList == NULL )
			{
			status = addContentListItem( envelopeInfoPtr, NULL, FALSE );
			if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
				return( status );
			}

		/* We can't continue until we're given some sort of keying resource */
		return( CRYPT_ENVELOPE_RESOURCE );
		}
	ENSURES( envelopeInfoPtr->actionList != NULL && \
			 envelopeInfoPtr->actionList->action == ACTION_CRYPT );

	/* Read and process PGP's peculiar two-stage IV */
	status = krnlSendMessage( envelopeInfoPtr->actionList->iCryptHandle,
							  IMESSAGE_GETATTRIBUTE, &ivSize, 
							  CRYPT_CTXINFO_IVSIZE );
	if( cryptStatusOK( status ) )
		status = sread( stream, ivInfoBuffer, ivSize + 2 );
	if( !cryptStatusError( status ) )
		{
		status = pgpProcessIV( envelopeInfoPtr->actionList->iCryptHandle,
							   ivInfoBuffer, ivSize + 2, ivSize, FALSE,
							   ( state == PGP_DEENVSTATE_ENCR ) ? \
								 TRUE : FALSE );
		}
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( status );
	envelopeInfoPtr->iCryptContext = \
							envelopeInfoPtr->actionList->iCryptHandle;
#if 0		/************************************************/
{			/* For buggy McAfee PGP with indefinite lengths */
BYTE buffer[ 1024 ], *srcPtr = sMemBufPtr( stream );

memcpy( buffer, srcPtr - 14, 32 );
krnlSendMessage( envelopeInfoPtr->iCryptContext, IMESSAGE_CTX_DECRYPT, 
				 buffer, 32 );
}			/* For buggy McAfee PGP with indefinite lengths */
#endif		/************************************************/

	/* If we're keeping track of the outer packet size in case there's no 
	   inner size info present, adjust it by the data that we've just 
	   processed and any other data that may be present */
	offset = stell( stream );
	if( state == PGP_DEENVSTATE_ENCR_MDC )
		{
		/* If we're using a definite-length encoding, adjust the total data 
		   length for the length of the tacked-on MDC packet */
		if( envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags & ENVDATA_NOSEGMENT )
			{
			/* There was a bug in all versions of GPG before 1.0.8, which 
			   omitted the MDC packet length when a packet was encrypted 
			   without compression.  As a result uncompressed messages 
			   generated by these versions can't be processed */
			offset += PGP_MDC_PACKET_SIZE;
			}
		else
			{
			/* We're using an indefinite-length encoding, remember that we 
			   have to adjust for the tacked-on MDC packet when we hit the 
			   last data segment */
			envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags |= ENVDATA_HASATTACHEDOOB;
			}
		}
/******/
/* Is the IV part of the length?  If so how to handle with indefinite lengths? */
/* (offset = IV size + optional MDC size, i.e. we adjust the length based on the */
/*  IV bytes read) */
/******/
	if( envelopeInfoPtr->payloadSize != CRYPT_UNUSED )
		envelopeInfoPtr->payloadSize -= offset;

	/* If there's an MDC packet present, prepare to hash the payload data */
	if( state == PGP_DEENVSTATE_ENCR_MDC )
		{
		MESSAGE_CREATEOBJECT_INFO createInfo;

		REQUIRES( moreActionsPossible( envelopeInfoPtr->actionList ) );

		/* Append a hash action to the action list */
		setMessageCreateObjectInfo( &createInfo, CRYPT_ALGO_SHA1 );
		status = krnlSendMessage( SYSTEM_OBJECT_HANDLE,
								  IMESSAGE_DEV_CREATEOBJECT,
								  &createInfo, OBJECT_TYPE_CONTEXT );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			return( status );
		status = addAction( &envelopeInfoPtr->actionList, 
							envelopeInfoPtr->memPoolState, ACTION_HASH,
							createInfo.cryptHandle );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			krnlSendNotifier( createInfo.cryptHandle,
							  IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT );
			return( status );
			}
		envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags |= ENVDATA_HASHACTIONSACTIVE;
		}

	ENSURES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );

	return( CRYPT_OK );
	}

/****************************************************************************
*																			*
*							Trailer Processing Routines						*
*																			*
****************************************************************************/

/* Process an MDC packet */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1 ) ) \
static int processMDC( INOUT ENVELOPE_INFO *envelopeInfoPtr )
	{
	int status;

	assert( isWritePtr( envelopeInfoPtr, sizeof( ENVELOPE_INFO ) ) );

	REQUIRES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );

	/* Make sure that there's enough data left in the stream to obtain the 
	   MDC info */
	if( envelopeInfoPtr->bufPos - \
			envelopeInfoPtr->dataLeft < PGP_MDC_PACKET_SIZE )
		return( CRYPT_ERROR_UNDERFLOW );

	/* Processing beyond this point gets rather complex because we have to 
	   defer reading the MDC packet until all of the remaining data has been 
	   popped, while processing reaches this point when data is pushed.  
	   Conventionally signed/hashed data hashes the plaintext so once we 
	   reach this point we can wrap up the hashing ready for the (user-
	   initiated) signature check.  The MDC packet however is still 
	   encrypted at this point, along with some or all of the data to be 
	   hashed, which means that we can't do anything yet:

		<-- Decr. -><- Encrypted ->
			--------+-------------+---------
		....		|///////| MDC |			....
			--------+-------------+---------
					^			  ^
				 bufPos			bufEnd
	   
	   In order to handle this special-case situation we'd have to add extra 
	   capabilities to the data-popping code to tell it that after a certain 
	   amount of data has been popped what's still left is MDC data.  This 
	   severely screws up the layering because the functionality required is 
	   neither at the cryptenv.c level nor at the decode.c level, and 
	   represents an approach that was abandoned in cryptlib 2.1 when it 
	   proved impossible to get it working reliably under all circumstances 
	   (it's provably impossible to do with the ASN.1 variable-length length 
	   encoding where changing data by one byte can result in a variable 
	   change of length for inner lengths.  This makes it impossible to 
	   encode some data lengths to the fixed size required by a CBC-mode 
	   cipher, and OpenPGP's more recent variable-lengths are no better).  
	   This is why cryptlib uses separate passes for each processing layer 
	   rather than trying to combine encryption and signing into a single 
	   pass.

	   Because of this, handling of MDC packets is only done if all of the 
	   data in the envelope has been popped (but see the note below), fully 
	   general handling won't be added unless there is sufficient user 
	   demand to justify messing up the architectural layering of the 
	   enveloping code.  Note that this situation can never occur since 
	   we're being called when data is pushed, the following code is present 
	   only as a representative example */
	if( envelopeInfoPtr->dataLeft == PGP_MDC_PACKET_SIZE )
		{
		BYTE buffer[ PGP_MDC_PACKET_SIZE + 8 ];
		int length;

		DEBUG_DIAG(( "Processing MDC data at end of packet" ));
		assert( DEBUG_WARN );

		status = envelopeInfoPtr->copyFromEnvelopeFunction( envelopeInfoPtr, 
										buffer, PGP_MDC_PACKET_SIZE, &length,
										ENVCOPY_FLAG_NONE );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			return( status );
		if( length < PGP_MDC_PACKET_SIZE || \
			buffer[ 0 ] != 0xD0 || buffer[ 1 ] != 0x14 )
			return( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA );

		/* Hash the trailer bytes (the start of the MDC packet) and wrap up 
		   the hashing */
		status = envelopeInfoPtr->processExtraData( envelopeInfoPtr, 
													buffer + 2,
													PGP_MDC_PACKET_SIZE - 2 );
		if( cryptStatusOK( status ) )
			status = envelopeInfoPtr->processExtraData( envelopeInfoPtr, 
														"", 0 );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			return( status );
		}

	ENSURES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );

	return( CRYPT_OK );
	}

/****************************************************************************
*																			*
*						Process Envelope Preamble/Postamble					*
*																			*
****************************************************************************/

/* Process the non-data portions of a PGP message.  This is a complex event-
   driven state machine, but instead of reading along a (hypothetical
   Turing-machine) tape someone has taken the tape and cut it into bits and
   keeps feeding them to us and saying "See what you can do with this" (and
   occasionally "Where's the bloody spoons?").  Since PGP uses sequential
   discrete packets rather than the nested objects encountered in the ASN.1-
   encoded data format the parsing code is made slightly simpler because
   (for example) the PKC info is just an unconnected sequence of packets
   rather than a SEQUENCE or SET OF as for cryptlib and PKCS #7/CMS.  OTOH 
   since there's no indication of what's next we have to perform a complex
   lookahead to see what actions we have to take once we get to the payload.
   The end result is that teh code is actually vastly more complex than the
   CMS equivalent */

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1 ) ) \
static int processPreamble( INOUT ENVELOPE_INFO *envelopeInfoPtr )
	{
	PGP_DEENV_STATE state = envelopeInfoPtr->pgpDeenvState;
	STREAM stream;
	int remainder, streamPos = 0, iterationCount, status = CRYPT_OK;

	assert( isWritePtr( envelopeInfoPtr, sizeof( ENVELOPE_INFO ) ) );

	REQUIRES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );

	/* If we've finished processing the start of the message, header, don't
	   do anything */
	if( state == PGP_DEENVSTATE_DONE )
		return( CRYPT_OK );

	sMemConnect( &stream, envelopeInfoPtr->buffer, envelopeInfoPtr->bufPos );

	/* Keep consuming information until we run out of input or reach the
	   plaintext data packet */
	for( iterationCount = 0;
		 state != PGP_DEENVSTATE_DONE && iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MED;
		 iterationCount++ )
		{
		/* Read the PGP packet type and figure out what we've got */
		if( state == PGP_DEENVSTATE_NONE )
			{
			status = processPacketHeader( envelopeInfoPtr, &stream, &state );
			if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
				break;

			/* Remember how far we got */
			streamPos = stell( &stream );
			}

		/* Process the start of an encrypted data packet */
		if( state == PGP_DEENVSTATE_ENCR || \
			state == PGP_DEENVSTATE_ENCR_MDC )
			{
			status = processEncryptedPacket( envelopeInfoPtr, &stream, state );
			if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
				{
				/* If it's a resource-needed status then it's not an 
				   error */
				if( status == CRYPT_ENVELOPE_RESOURCE )
					break;

				setErrorString( ENVELOPE_ERRINFO, 
								"Invalid PGP encrypted data packet header", 
								40 );
				break;
				}

			/* Remember where we are and move on to the next state */
			streamPos = stell( &stream );
			state = PGP_DEENVSTATE_DATA;
			}

		/* Process the start of a data packet */
		if( state == PGP_DEENVSTATE_DATA )
			{
			const int originalDataFlags = envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags;

			/* Synchronise the data stream processing to the start of the
			   encapsulated data.  This is made somewhat complex by PGP's
			   awkward packet format (see the comment for 
			   processPacketDataHeader()) which, unlike CMS:

				[ Hdr [ Encaps [ Octet String ] ] ]

			   has:
						   [ Hdr | Octet String ]
				  [ Keyex ][ Hdr | Octet String ]
				[ Onepass ][ Hdr | Octet String ][ Signature ]
				   [ Copr ][ Hdr | Octet String ]

			   This means that if we're not processing a data packet then 
			   the content isn't the payload but a futher set of discrete 
			   packets that we don't want to touch.  To work around this we 
			   temporarily set the ENVDATA_NOLENGTHINFO flag to indicate 
			   that it's a blob to be processed as an opaque unit, at the 
			   same time temporarily clearing any other flags that might 
			   mess up the opaque-blob handling */
			if( envelopeInfoPtr->usage != ACTION_NONE )
				envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags = ENVDATA_NOLENGTHINFO;
			status = envelopeInfoPtr->syncDeenvelopeData( envelopeInfoPtr,
														  &stream );
			envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags = originalDataFlags;
			if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
				{
				setErrorString( ENVELOPE_ERRINFO, 
								"Couldn't synchronise envelope state prior "
								"to data payload processing", 68 );
				break;
				}
			streamPos = 0;

			/* Move on to the next state.  For plain data we're done,
			   however for other content types we have to either process or
			   strip out the junk that PGP puts at the start of the 
			   content */
			if( envelopeInfoPtr->usage != ACTION_NONE )
				{
				envelopeInfoPtr->oobEventCount = 1;
				state = PGP_DEENVSTATE_DATA_HEADER;
				}
			else
				state = PGP_DEENVSTATE_DONE;
			
			ENSURES( checkActions( envelopeInfoPtr ) );
			}

		/* Burrow down into the encapsulated data to see what's next */
		if( state == PGP_DEENVSTATE_DATA_HEADER )
			{
			/* If there's no out-of-band data left to remove at the start of
			   the payload, we're done.  This out-of-band data handling 
			   sometimes requires two passes, the first time through 
			   oobEventCount is nonzero because it's been set in the 
			   preceding PGP_DEENVSTATE_DATA state and we fall through to 
			   processPacketDataHeader() which decrements the oobEventCount
			   to zero.  However processPacketDataHeader() may need to read 
			   out-of-band data in which case on the second time around 
			   oobDataLeft will be nonzero, resulting in a second call to
			   processPacketDataHeader() to clear the remaining out-of-band
			   data */
			if( envelopeInfoPtr->oobEventCount <= 0 && \
				envelopeInfoPtr->oobDataLeft <= 0 )
				{
				state = PGP_DEENVSTATE_DONE;
				break;
				}

			/* Process the encapsulated data header */
			status = processPacketDataHeader( envelopeInfoPtr, &state );
			if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
				{
				setErrorString( ENVELOPE_ERRINFO, 
								"Invalid PGP encapsulated content header", 
								39 );
				break;
				}
			}
		}
	sMemDisconnect( &stream );
	if( iterationCount >= FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MED )
		{
		/* Technically this would be an overflow but that's a recoverable
		   error so we make it a BADDATA, which is really what it is */
		return( CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA );
		}
	envelopeInfoPtr->pgpDeenvState = state;

	ENSURES( streamPos >= 0 && streamPos < MAX_INTLENGTH && \
			 envelopeInfoPtr->bufPos - streamPos >= 0 );

	/* Consume the input that we've processed so far by moving everything 
	   past the current position down to the start of the envelope buffer */
	remainder = envelopeInfoPtr->bufPos - streamPos;
	REQUIRES( remainder >= 0 && remainder < MAX_INTLENGTH && \
			  streamPos + remainder <= envelopeInfoPtr->bufSize );
	if( remainder > 0 && streamPos > 0 )
		{
		REQUIRES( rangeCheck( streamPos, remainder, 
							  envelopeInfoPtr->bufSize ) );
		memmove( envelopeInfoPtr->buffer, envelopeInfoPtr->buffer + streamPos,
				 remainder );
		}
	envelopeInfoPtr->bufPos = remainder;
	ENSURES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( status );

	/* If all went OK but we're still not out of the header information,
	   return an underflow error */
	return( ( state != PGP_DEENVSTATE_DONE ) ? \
			CRYPT_ERROR_UNDERFLOW : CRYPT_OK );
	}

CHECK_RETVAL STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1 ) ) \
static int processPostamble( INOUT ENVELOPE_INFO *envelopeInfoPtr,
							 STDC_UNUSED const BOOLEAN dummy )
	{
	CONTENT_LIST *contentListPtr;
	const BOOLEAN hasMDC = \
			( envelopeInfoPtr->usage == ACTION_CRYPT && \
			  ( envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags & ENVDATA_HASHACTIONSACTIVE ) ) ? \
			TRUE : FALSE;
	int iterationCount, status = CRYPT_OK;

	assert( isWritePtr( envelopeInfoPtr, sizeof( ENVELOPE_INFO ) ) );

	REQUIRES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );

	/* If that's all there is, return */
	if( envelopeInfoPtr->usage != ACTION_SIGN && !hasMDC )
		return( CRYPT_OK );

	/* If there's an MDC packet present complete the hashing and make sure
	   that the integrity check matches */
	if( hasMDC )
		{
		status = processMDC( envelopeInfoPtr );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			retExt( status,
					( status, ENVELOPE_ERRINFO,
					  "Invalid MDC packet data" ) );
			}
		
		return( CRYPT_OK );
		}

	/* Find the signature information in the content list.  In theory this
	   could get ugly because there could be multiple one-pass signature
	   packets present but PGP handles multiple signatures by nesting them 
	   so this isn't a problem */
	for( contentListPtr = envelopeInfoPtr->contentList, iterationCount = 0;
		 contentListPtr != NULL && \
			contentListPtr->envInfo != CRYPT_ENVINFO_SIGNATURE && \
			iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MED;
		 contentListPtr = contentListPtr->next, iterationCount++ );
	ENSURES( iterationCount < FAILSAFE_ITERATIONS_MED );
	ENSURES( contentListPtr != NULL );

	/* PGP 2.x prepended (!!) signatures to the signed data, OpenPGP fixed 
	   this by splitting the signature into a header with signature info and 
	   a trailer with the actual signature.  If we're processing a PGP 2.x
	   signature we'll already have the signature data present so we only 
	   check for signature data if it's not already available */
	if( contentListPtr->object == NULL )
		{
		STREAM stream;
		long packetLength;
		PGP_PACKET_TYPE packetType;

		/* Make sure that there's enough data left in the stream to do 
		   something with.  We require a minimum of 44 bytes, the size
		   of the DSA signature payload, in the stream */
		if( envelopeInfoPtr->bufPos - \
				envelopeInfoPtr->dataLeft < PGP_MAX_HEADER_SIZE + 44 )
			return( CRYPT_ERROR_UNDERFLOW );

		REQUIRES( moreContentItemsPossible( envelopeInfoPtr->contentList ) );

		/* Read the signature packet at the end of the payload */
		sMemConnect( &stream, envelopeInfoPtr->buffer + envelopeInfoPtr->dataLeft,
					 envelopeInfoPtr->bufPos - envelopeInfoPtr->dataLeft );
		status = getPacketInfo( &stream, envelopeInfoPtr, &packetType, 
								&packetLength, NULL, 8 );
		if( cryptStatusOK( status ) && packetType != PGP_PACKET_SIGNATURE )
			status = CRYPT_ERROR_BADDATA;
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			sMemDisconnect( &stream );
			retExt( status,
					( status, ENVELOPE_ERRINFO,
					  "Invalid PGP signature packet header" ) );
			}
		sseek( &stream, 0 );
		status = addContentListItem( envelopeInfoPtr, &stream, TRUE );
		sMemDisconnect( &stream );
		if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
			{
			retExt( status,
					( status, ENVELOPE_ERRINFO,
					  "Invalid PGP signature packet" ) );
			}
		}

	/* When we reach this point there may still be unhashed data left in the 
	   buffer (it won't have been hashed yet because the hashing is performed 
	   when the data is copied out, after unwrapping and whatnot) so we hash 
	   it before we exit.  Since we don't wrap up the hashing as we do with
	   any other format (PGP hashes in all sorts of odds and ends after 
	   hashing the message body) we have to manually turn off hashing here */
	if( envelopeInfoPtr->dataLeft > 0 )
		{
		status = envelopeInfoPtr->processExtraData( envelopeInfoPtr,
						envelopeInfoPtr->buffer, envelopeInfoPtr->dataLeft );
		}
	envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags &= ~ENVDATA_HASHACTIONSACTIVE;
	if( cryptStatusError( status ) )
		return( status );

	ENSURES( sanityCheck( envelopeInfoPtr ) );

	return( CRYPT_OK );
	}

/****************************************************************************
*																			*
*							Envelope Access Routines						*
*																			*
****************************************************************************/

STDC_NONNULL_ARG( ( 1 ) ) \
void initPGPDeenveloping( INOUT ENVELOPE_INFO *envelopeInfoPtr )
	{
	assert( isWritePtr( envelopeInfoPtr, sizeof( ENVELOPE_INFO ) ) );
	
	REQUIRES_V( envelopeInfoPtr->flags & ENVELOPE_ISDEENVELOPE );

	/* Set the access method pointers */
	envelopeInfoPtr->processPreambleFunction = processPreamble;
	envelopeInfoPtr->processPostambleFunction = processPostamble;
	envelopeInfoPtr->checkAlgo = pgpCheckAlgo;

	/* Set up the processing state information */
	envelopeInfoPtr->pgpDeenvState = PGP_DEENVSTATE_NONE;

	/* Turn off segmentation of the envelope payload.  PGP has a single 
	   length at the start of the data and doesn't segment the payload */
	envelopeInfoPtr->dataFlags |= ENVDATA_NOSEGMENT;
	}
#endif /* USE_PGP */
