# Copyright (C) 2007-2010, Parrot Foundation.
# $Id: pdd18_security.pod 45652 2010-04-14 02:57:43Z coke $

=head1 PDD 18: Security Model

=head2 Abstract

This PDD describes the security infrastructure of Parrot.

=head2 Version

$Revision: 45652 $

=head2 Description

Parrot will be used in a variety of different application contexts, each with
its own unique security needs.

=over 4

=item * Small devices such as cell phones need tight control over resource
usage (CPU, memory, etc).

=item * Web applications need filtering and validation of incoming data and
blocks to prevent the use of unfiltered data in execution contexts (SQL,
system calls, runtime eval, etc).

=item * Web browser embedding, i.e. client-side execution of high-level
languages, needs control over resource access on the client machine (local
disk access, local network connections), sandboxing for downloaded code,
limits on what code can be loaded and executed, and limits on certain dynamic
features (runtime eval of code, modification of global namespaces).

=item * Database engine embedding, i.e. server-side execution of high-level
languages as stored procedures, also needs control over resource access (disk
access, network connections), and limits on loaded code, but additionally
needs administrator configured lists of allowed libraries and library paths.

=item * Security auditing tools need hooks in the compilation process for
static analysis.

=back

=head2 Implementation

Parrot's security infrastructure is not an independent, encapsulated
subsystem.  It is a series of related features and functionality spread
throughout the virtual machine.

=head3 Resource Quotas

Resource quotas ensure that an interpreter doesn't use more CPU time, memory,
or system resources than are allowed. Quotas are most useful when running code
in a managed environment such as a web, database, or game server where no one
interpreter is allowed to consume too many resources and impact the system too
badly. CPU time is managed by the runloop. The memory system handles memory
quotas, the I/O system handles file open and pending I/O count quotas, and so
on.

=head3 Privileges

A privilege system is used to restrict code from performing certain
actions. When privilege checking is in force the code may need a particular
privilege to load a library, or open a file.

Privileges can be quite broad, on the order of "allow file I/O", or as
fine-grained as allowing/denying the right to run one particular opcode.
Privileges are discrete entities, They are also hierarchical, one privilege
can be specified to follow from another privilege (the privilege FOO may be
automatically granted to anything with the privilege BAR). Anything with the
ALL privilege is automatically granted all other privileges in the system.
Privileges are user-definable, but user-defined privileges can only give
grants of rights, they cannot take them (BAZ may grant its privileges to any
user with FOO privileges, but it can't automatically grant itself all the FOO
privileges).

A few example privileges:

=over 4

=item ALL

Granted all privileges.

=item IO

May run I/O operations.

=item INVOKE

May invoke subroutines, methods, or return continuations.

=item RETURN

May invoke return continuations (not subroutines or methods). (RETURN
privileges are granted to anyone with INVOKE privileges.)

=item SYSCALL

May run a system call.

=item COMPILE

May compile code from string source at runtime (eval).

=item LOAD

May load libraries at runtime.

=back

=head4 Users

For the most part, a "user" in the Parrot privilege system doesn't correspond
to a literal user (though it may, if Parrot is running embedded in a database
engine or multi-user gaming system). A user is a bundle of privileges,
identified by a user ID, and authenticated with a pass key. The privilege ID
can be cheaply passed around, and validated whenever a restricted action is
performed.

=head4 Opcode Disabling

All opcodes in Parrot can be selectively disabled, by short name (C<print>),
long name (including signature, C<print_sc>), or by group (C<io>, C<net>,
C<load>, C<compile>). They can also be selectively enabled, by defining a
privilege with "disable all", and then allowing only specific opcodes.

When running in a secured mode, all dynamically loaded opcode libraries are
disabled by default, and have to be explicitly enabled (individually, as a
group, or by a system-wide configuration).

Opcodes are tagged with their group in their definition, and may be tagged in
multiple groups, as in:

  inline op print(in INT) :base_io,io {
      ...
  }

=head4 Library Loading

In certain environments, it's desirable to be able to restrict what libraries
may be loaded by code running on the virtual machine. The allowed library list
is defined in a system-wide configuration file, or set at runtime by a user
with administrative privileges. Libraries may be signed, with the key
specified in the library list and verified on loading. Libraries that can't be
signed (C libraries), can be check-summed to ensure that the library you load
is the exact file you expect.

Generally, library loading restrictions are useful in an embedded environment
like a database engine or web browser, or a multi-user environment like a web
hosting server, where arbitrarily extended behavior is a security risk. It can
also be a useful development tool, as running your daily development
environment with library loading restrictions turned on means you always know
exactly what dependencies the code base has.

=head4 Resource Access

Access to resources such as the local disk, network, are controlled through
the privilege system. Resource access limitations are a combination of
disabled opcodes, blocked library loading, and privilege checks within
standard libraries for I/O, network, etc.

=head3 Sandboxing

A sandbox is a virtual machine within the virtual machine. It's a safe zone to
contain code from an untrusted source. In the extreme case, a sandbox is
completely isolated from all outside code, with no access to read or write to
the surrounding environment. In the general case, a sandbox will have the
ability to read from, but not write to the surrounding environment (global
namespaces, for example), with a very narrow and carefully filtered route to
send some data back to the code that called it. The sandbox system works
together with the privileges system, in that by default code in the sandbox
has no privileges outside the sandbox, but may be granted privileges.

=head3 Data Firewall

Any data that originates from user input (command-line, user prompt, web form,
file access, network operation) is a potential security risk. The best place
to trap bad data is at the point of entry, before it touches a single line of
code. When the data firewall is enabled, all data entering from an external
source or crossing a sandbox barrier is subjected to filter rules. The filter
rules in force are configurable, and filters can be selectively enabled and
disabled for particular types and sources of data.

Data filters can be sanitizing or validating. Sanitizing data filters modify
the data as it passes (escaping quotes, encoding entities, etc). Validating
filters check that the data meets certain conditions (the presence or absence
of specific features), and when it fails to meet those conditions, the data is
blocked from passing the firewall (returning an empty string or PMCNULL
instead of the expected data). Data filters can also be user-defined, as a
regular expression (PGE rule) or subroutine.

The same filter rules applied within the data firewall can be called
explicitly on any data.

=head3 Bytecode Validation

In normal operation the interpreter assumes that the bytecode that it executes
is valid -- that is, any parameters to opcodes are sane, data structures are
intact. When bytecode validation is enabled, however, Parrot assumes that
bytecode is not necessarily valid. The interpreter then, at runtime, makes
sure that all specified register numbers are within valid range, and string
and PMC structures used are valid.

=head3 Auditing Hooks

Even in dynamic languages, it's possible to perform a degree of static
analysis for security risks. The opcode syntax tree (OST) produced by the
language compiler is a good data source for static analysis checks, because
it's low-level enough that you can check for individual opcodes that will be
called (checking for I/O, networking, and other similar operations, or unknown
dynamically-loaded opcodes), and high-level enough that you still have access
to substantial metadata from the parse. The standard compiler tools already
have the ability to add and remove stages from the compilation process. Static
analysis tools can be implemented by stopping the standard compilation at the
OST phase, and inserting an additional phase to scan the OST. Because the OST
form is standard across high-level languages running on Parrot, the tools can
be written once and applied to many languages.

=head2 References

"Exploring the Broken Web": L<http://talks.php.net/show/osdc07>

"Safe ERB": L<http://agilewebdevelopment.com/plugins/safe_erb>

pecl/filter: L<http://us2.php.net/filter>

Rasmus Lerdorf for the term "data firewall".

=cut

__END__
Local Variables:
  fill-column:78
End:
vim: expandtab shiftwidth=4:
